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INTRODUCTION

Death penalty litigation that reaches the Supreme Court now
causes at least as much consternation as hope among opponents of capital punishment. Simply not losing rights that once were considered secure can be tantamount to victory in capital cases decided by the Court,
and few defendants and opponents of capital punishment expect much
more. 1 It was not always so. Hopes were once high that the Supreme
Court, and the federal courts generally, would effectively bring an end
to capital punishment in America.2
That prospect is now remote, at best. Death row populations are
skyrocketing3 and executions are on the rise. 4 Half of the federal judici1. For example, in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982), the Court ruled that the
death penalty could not be imposed upon one convicted of felony murder "who neither took life,
attempted to take life, nor intended to take life." Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 158 (1987), the Enmund rule was modified to allow the capital punishment of participants in
a felony murder who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill, but who were "major
participants" in the felony and acted with "reckless indifference to human life."
When the Court resolved that the death penalty was not under all circumstances a "cruel and
unusual" punishment and approved procedures for its administration, the Court identified as "an
important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice" that the Georgia Supreme Court
determine whether any given death sentence "is disproportionate compared to those sentences
imposed in similar cases." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion). In 1984,
however, the Justices ruled that state supreme court comparative proportionality review was not
constitutionally required under all circumstances. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
The Court also imposed stringent standards for the exclusion of prospective jurors from sitting on capital juries because of their views about the death penalty. See Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968). Yet the Court significantly relaxed these standards in Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985). For a discussion of death qualification of jurors under Witherspoon and Witt, see
infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
When the Court rejected a claim in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), that racial discrimination had infected the administration of Georgia's capital punishment system, it was widely
perceived as ending "what death penalty opponents had called their last sweeping challenge to
capital punishment." See N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 6; see also Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1741 (1987) (stating that
"[a]fter McCleskey, nothing appears left of the abolitionist campaign in the courts-nothing but
the possibility of small-scale tinkering with the details of administration and, of course, persistent
claims in lower courts of specific errors in the multitude of cases where the sentence is imposed").
2. See generally H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 11-12
(1977); M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
Some still forecast that the Supreme Court ultimately will take a position of leadership in the
abolition of the death penalty, although not in the near future. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 154-58 (1986); Brennan, ConstitutionalAdjudication and
the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 313, 331 (1986).
3. As of March 1, 1989, there were approximately 2186 people on death rows across the country. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter
DEATH Row U.S.A.]. Just over six years earlier at the end of 1982, 1066 people were on death row,
and 10 years earlier at the end of 1977, 423 people were awaiting execution. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984, table 6, at 16 (1986) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984].
4. Between 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punish-

1989]

DEATH PENALTY

1301

ary has been appointed by a President who has largely fulfilled his
promises to name law and order and strict constructionist judges to the
bench.' A majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court have not chosen to give an expansive interpretation to the federal constitution in
capital cases. 6 If even a small measure of the success that was enjoyed
in the federal courts in the 1960s and early 1970s is to be regained,
litigation against the death penalty must reflect different strategies and
be pursued in different forums.
An alternative strategy has been unfolding quietly and without apparent organization over the past several years. Death penalty laws increasingly have been challenged under state constitutions, on a variety
of grounds, in the several states that retain capital punishment. This
trend has been part of a general and remarkable rediscovery of state
courts and state constitutions 7 prompted in part by the perception that
ment statutes in several states, see infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text, and 1982, a total of
six people were executed in the United States. No more than two of these executions occurred
during the same calendar year. In the ensuing years the numbers of people executed gradually
increased: 5 in 1983; 21 in 1984; 18 in 1985; 18 in 1986; 25 in 1987; and 11 in 1988. DEATH Row
U.S.A., supra note 3, at 3. Two people have been executed between January 1, 1989, and March 1,
1989. Id.
5. With regard to the federal judiciary, the 1980 Republican Party Platform promised to
"secure the appointment of women and men. . . whose judicial philosophy is characterized by the
highest regard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens." REPUBLICAN PARTY, REPUBLICAN
PARTY PLATFORM 11 (1980), quoted in Rowland, Senger & Carp, PresidentialEffects on Criminal
Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 LAW & Soc'v REV. 191, 194
(1988). The 1984 party platform reaffirmed this policy, and in 1986 President Reagan warned that
his efforts to appoint the right breed of federal judges would be undermined if Democrats took
control of the Senate. Id. He stated: " 'We don't need a bunch of sociology majors on the bench.
What we need are strong judges . . . who do not hesitate to put criminals where they belong,
behind bars.' "Id. (quoting N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A3). By early 1988 President Reagan had
named approximately 47% of the sitting judges to the federal bench, including 265 district court
judges, 79 court of appeals judges, and 3 of the present members of the Supreme Court, in addition
to naming William Rehnquist the Chief Justice. The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 18, 1988, at 22. By most accounts the President succeeded in identifying and appointing to
the federal courts individuals who espouse a conservative judicial philosophy. See Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313 (1985); Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324 (1987);
Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuationof a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986); Slotnick, Federal Judicial Recruitment and Selection
Research: A Review Essay, 71 JUDICATURE 317, 321 (1988).
6. See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text. The general premise is that "the decision as
to who will make the decisions affects what decisions will be made." J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 29 (1955); see Slotnick, supra note 5, at 317.

7. Since 1970 approximately 350 to 400 state supreme court decisions have interpreted state
constitutional provisions to afford rights beyond those recognized in the United States Constitution. See Collins & Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial Review: 1985 Survey of State
ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986) [hereinafter Collins &
Galie, 1985 Survey]; Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 600-01
(1986); Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, 496 ANNALS 12, 22 (1988). For a re-
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the Supreme Court has retreated from its position of leadership in protecting individual liberties under the Federal Bill of Rights.'
In this Article we describe recent death penalty litigation before
the Supreme Court and numerous state courts, concentrating upon
state court decisions founded upon state constitutional grounds. This
discussion is necessarily an overview, but we hope to suggest the general
avenues that may be explored in challenging capital punishment legislation in light of the unique constitutional provisions, history, traditions,
and circumstances within the individual states. We conclude with brief
observations about the necessity of developing both sound legal doctrine and a supporting empirical foundation in order to mount effective
challenges to the death penalty on state constitutional grounds.
II.

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT

A.

The United States Supreme Court and Capital Punishment

Death penalty cases have long progressed from state courts to the
Supreme Court, and there served as ringing examples both of how the
states were not to administer their criminal laws, and of what the states
were bound to do in the future to comply with the commands of the
federal constitution.' Until the 1960s, however, it was never questioned
whether the death penalty was permissible under the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court assumed the legality of capital punishment as a criminal penalty in numerous cases. 10 The first signal that
some members of the Court were concerned about the constitutionality
of the death penalty appeared in Justice Goldberg's dissent from the
cent, comprehensive listing of state cases that have relied upon state constitutional rights, as well
as law review articles discussing this trend, see Collins & Galie, State Constitutional Law, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-9 to S-19 [hereinafter Collins & Galie, State Constitutional Law].
8. Some disagreement exists about the extent to which the Burger Court actually has retreated from the Warren Court's major decisions concerning individual liberties. See, e.g., Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions:The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63
TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1153 n.42 (1985); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day
of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Israel, Criminal Procedure,the Burger Court, and
the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319 (1977); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). It seems
safe to conclude that the Court's criminal procedure decisions have been more restrictive in the
post-Warren Court era. See Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 547 (1986); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 403 (1984).
9. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confessions); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel).
10. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878).
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denial of certiorari in the 1963 capital case, Rudolph v. Alabama.11 By
1967 mounting uncertainties about the legality of capital punishment
under the federal constitution caused stays of execution across the
country.1"
Scores of death penalties were vacated, or convictions reversed, in a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions in the mid- and late
1960s. Lawyers representing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF)
brought many of the cases in an intensive, highly concentrated campaign to abolish the death penalty through federal court litigation. 13
The cases-Witherspoon v. Illinois,"' United States v. Jackson,6
Boykin v. Alabama,1 6 and Maxwell v. Bishop7-represented

gradual

victories in the legal assault upon the death penalty and gave rise to
11. 375 U.S. 889 (1963). Justices Douglas and Brennan joined Justice Goldberg's dissent. Rudolph and a companion case in which the Court also denied certiorari, Snider v. Cunningham, 375
U.S. 889 (1963), were rape convictions for which the death penalty had been imposed. See M.
MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 28-34.
12. Luis Jose Monge, executed June 2, 1967, in Colorado, was the last to die prior to the
judicial moratorium against capital punishment. M. MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 113. There were no
further executions until 1977, when Gary Gilmore died before a firing squad in Utah. See CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1984, supra note 3, table 6, at 16. See generally N. MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG
(1979) (chronicling the life and death of Gary Gilmore).
13. See M. MELTSNER, supra note 2 (presenting a detailed account of the Legal Defense Fund
lawyers' strategy and campaign against the death penalty in the courts). For a critical review of
this strategy, see Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign:The Distorting
Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1985).
14. 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (vacating death sentence, but not conviction, on the ground that
potential jurors with personal scruples against capital punishment had erroneously been excluded
from service on capital jury); see infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
15. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Court declared that the death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1956), was unconstitutional because only if the accused was
convicted after trial by jury could the death penalty be imposed. The Court held that this imposition inevitably discouraged or penalized assertion of the rights to plead not guilty and to be tried
by a jury. Id.
16. 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (invalidating guilty plea to robbery charges and resultant death penalty because there was no affirmative record made that the plea had been entered in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary manner). It was urged in Boykin that the death penalty for the crime of
robbery was a cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, although because of the Court's ruling on the guilty plea issue it did not reach the penalty question.
See M. MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 168-85.

17. 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (vacating death sentence in rape case on the ground that potential
trial jurors had erroneously been disqualified for cause under Witherspoon). Maxwell involved the
conviction and death sentence of a black man convicted of raping a white woman in Arkansas.
Research evidence suggested that the death penalty for rape was reserved almost exclusively for
black defendant-white victim cases. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated,
398 U.S. 262 (1970); Wolfgang & Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty, 407
ANNALS 119 (1973). Maxwell was argued before the Supreme Court on the ground that the
standardless exercise of sentencing discretion allowed racially disparate use of the death penalty
and thus was unconstitutional. The Court declined to address this issue when it vacated Maxwell's
death sentence on Witherspoon grounds. See M. MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 89-105, 149-67, 186213.
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cautious optimism about the campaign's chances for success. These and
other cases pressed federal constitutional grounds and literally kept
hundreds of people alive who awaited execution under the authority of
state laws. 8 Time, however, soon began to catch up with the abolitionist movement in the federal courts.
By 1970, Warren Burger had replaced Earl Warren as the Chief
Justice, Justice Blackmun had assumed Justice Fortas's seat on the
Court,'9 and the war against crime had made huge political gains at the
expense of the war against the death penalty. The Court dealt the abo20
litionists a serious blow in the 1971 case of McGautha v. California
when the Court concluded (with its two newest members joining a six to
three majority) that existing state procedures for the administration of
the death penalty were not inconsistent with the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The McGautha Court specifically
declined to invalidate death penalties imposed in the absence of legislative standards to guide sentencing discretion, 2' and further refused to
require that a separate hearing be conducted subsequent to the guilt
phase of a trial to help inform death penalty decisions.2 2 Shortly thereafter the Court agreed to decide whether the death penalty, as administered, violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
18. By the end of 1971 approximately 640 persons were under sentence of death across the
United States. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984, supra note 3, table 6, at 16.
19. Justice Fortas resigned from the Court in May 1969, amidst allegations that he had improperly accepted money in a matter that created a conflict of interest with his duties as a justice.
His departure disturbed the delicate balance on the Court which had given LDF lawyers cautious
optimism that they might prevail on some of their major claims against the death penalty. See M.
MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 186-88, 199.
20. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun. Justice Black concurred "in the Court's judgments and in substantially all of its opinion." Id. at 225 (Black, J., concurring). Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
21. In a famous passage, Justice Harlan explained: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the
sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." McGautha, 402
U.S. at 204. He concluded:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it
quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power
to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution....
The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either
meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need.
Id. at 207-08 (footnote omitted).
22. Two cases were joined for decision: McGautha v. Californiaand Crampton v. Ohio. California used a bifurcated capital trial with separate guilt determination and sentencing hearings
although it had no legislative standards to guide the exercise of sentencing discretion. Ohio procedures included neither a separate sentencing hearing nor capital sentencing standards; juries decided both guilt and the appropriate sentence at the conclusion of the trial on guilt or innocence.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 185, 208-20.
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unusual punishments, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.23
The Court accepted for review two rape cases and two murder convictions which had resulted in sentences of death to enable the Court to
decide this issue.2" The Court announced the decisions in 1972, under
the now famous lead case of Furman v. Georgia."' By a vote of five to
four, and through nine separate opinions, 6 the Justices ruled that the
eighth amendment forbade imposition of the death penalty under the
same procedures upheld on due process grounds in McGautha. This decision invalidated virtually all death sentences in the country,2 7 and
quickly overshadowed the California Supreme Court's prior decision
striking down that state's death penalty on state constitutional
grounds, 2 8 thus mooting a case originally accepted for Supreme Court
29
review.
Furman irretrievably involved the Supreme Court in arbitrating
federal constitutional challenges to state death penalty legislation. Having once decided that state procedures for the administration of the
death penalty were constitutionally inadequate, the Justices quickly
were called upon to review the states' subsequent endeavors to enact
23. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Court made
its prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. See People v. Aikens, 70 Cal. 2d 369, 450 P.2d 258, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969) (murder);
Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969), rev'd, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (murder); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969), rev'd, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (rape);
Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev'd, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (rape).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
26. The judgment in Furman was announced in a brief per curiam opinion: "The Court holds
that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the [elighth and [f]ourteenth [almendments." Furman,408 U.S.
at 239-40. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall concurred in the judgment.
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
27. Rhode Island provided for mandatory capital punishment for murder by a life term inmate, and its death penalty statute thus was unaffected by Furman, which invalidated legislation
that authorized capital punishment at the discretion of the sentencing authority. Furman, 408 U.S.
at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, Furman rendered invalid death penalty legislation in
39 states, the District of Columbia, and within federal jurisdiction, and resulted in approximately
600 death sentences being vacated across the country. Id. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Court subsequently declared mandatory death penalty statutes violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality
decision); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality decision).
28. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972); see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
29. Aikens v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 369, 450 P.2d 258, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S 813 (1972); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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capital sentencing statutes that would pass constitutional muster.3 0 In
1976, in Gregg v. Georgias ' and four companion cases,3 2 the Court affirmed that capital punishment was not per se violative of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. 3 It further ruled that while death
sentences that followed mandatorily from conviction were unconstitutional,34 legislation that narrowed the range of cases for which the death
penalty was a possible sanction and provided standards to help guide
capital sentencing discretion was facially constitutional. 5
As procedures for implementing the death penalty were fine-tuned
in38 and the substantive boundaries of its lawful application were
plumbed, a second generation of federal constitutional challenges followed.37 In the post-Gregg epoch, through 1982, the Court vacated
sentences or convictions in all but one of the capital cases accepted for
review,38 and the lower federal courts regularly struck capital sentences
30. Between 1972 and 1976 at least 35 states re-enacted capital punishment legislation. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion). See generally F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 41-45. The authors attributed the post-Furman legislative response in
large part to the desire of state legislatures to affirm their authority in the face of contrary federal
action, "[r]ather than a resurgent national perception of capital punishment as the solution to the
problem of criminal homicide. . . ." Id. at 44.
31. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson,
428 U.S. at 280; Roberts (Stanislaus),428 U.S. at 325.
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (holding that "the death penalty is not a form of punishment that
may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstqnces of the offense, regardless of the character of
the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it"). Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the conclusion that the death penalty is not per se a
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 230-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
34. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts (Stanislaus), 428 U.S. at 325; see supra note 27.
35. Gregg approved capital legislation that broadly defined the crime of murder but required
that the sentencing jury find one or more statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt before deciding to impose the death penalty. 428 U.S. at 206-07. Proffitt upheld legislation
that, unlike Georgia's, specified both aggravating and mitigating factors which it required the sentencing authority to consider before deciding upon a capital sentence. 428 U.S. at 250. Jurek approved a scheme that defined a narrow class of capital murders and required that a death sentence
be imposed if the sentencing jury responded affirmatively to three questions. The most significant
of the questions was " 'whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.' " 428 U.S. at 269 (quoting
TEx. CODE CRIM PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976)). See generally Note, Discretion and the Constitutionalityof the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HA. L. REV. 1690 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)
(per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
37. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (forbidding the death penalty for one convicted of felony murder who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill the homicide
victims); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the death penalty
for the rape of an adult).
38. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 811 n.23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The sole exception was
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), which upheld the death sentence against ex post facto and
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in state cases.3 9 While these were important victories, they were conspicuously incomplete and ultimately would prove fleeting. The Court
denied certiorari in numerous capital cases, executions resumed,40 and
the tide was about to take a dramatic and ominous turn.
' a time
The year 1983 has been called a "dark year on death row,"41
42
'
when the Supreme Court began to "deregulate" the administration of
state capital punishment laws under the federal constitution. Case
names such as Zant v. Stephens,3 Barclay v. Florida," California v.
Ramos,4 5 and Barefoot v. Estelle4 6 had significantly different connotations from the litany that characterized death penalty litigation in the
1960s. The latter decision went so far as to uphold procedures designed
to expedite the federal courts' review of state death penalty cases, so as
not to frustrate the states' interests in carrying out lawfully imposed
death sentences.' 7
other challenges.
39. See Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that in
recent years the success rate for condemned state prisoners upon federal habeas corpus review in
capital cases ranged from 60% to 70%); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[o]f the 34 capital cases decided on the merits by [c]ourts of [a]ppeals
since 1976 in which a prisoner appealed from the denial of habeas relief, the prisoner has prevailed
in no fewer than 23 cases, or approximately 70% of the time"); Greenberg, Against the American
System of CapitalPunishment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1670, 1671-72 (1986); Greenberg, CapitalPunishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 918 (1982); see also Culver & Wold, Rose Bird and the
Politics of Judicial Accountability in California,70 JUDICATURE 81, 86 (1986) (citing a 1985 newspaper survey that concluded that state supreme courts across the country have invalidated death
sentences in approximately 43% of the capital cases they have decided and that federal courts
have done so in about 60% of the capital cases in which they had considered such issue).
40. See supra note 4.
41. Note, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and
Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 689 (1984).
42. See Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305; see also W. WHITE, LIFE IN
THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES (1984); Geimer, Death at any Cost: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 737 (1985); Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of
Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 (1984).
43. 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (upholding the death penalty under Georgia law, notwithstanding the
invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing jury prior to its decision to impose punishment of death).
44. 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (approving the death sentence notwithstanding the sentencing
judge's reliance on aggravating factors not authorized by Florida law).
45. 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (rejecting the claim that arbitrary factors were interjected into the
capital sentencing decision by jury instructions that the governor of the state retained the authority to grant a reprieve, pardon, or commutation if a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
were imposed instead of the death penalty).
46. 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding the expedited procedures used by the federal court of
appeals to review the district court's denial of relief in a state capital case, and allowing expert
testimony about a capital defendant's likelihood of engaging in future acts of violence over claims
that such predictions are inherently unreliable).
47. Id. at 888 (stating that "unlike a term of years, a death sentence cannot begin to be
carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain outstanding").
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Major setbacks ensued in the Court, sending death penalty foes
reeling. Pulley v. Harris48 upheld California's death penalty procedures,
notwithstanding the absence of any comparative proportionality review
of capital sentences by the state supreme court.49 Spaziano v. Florida"
definitively resolved that the federal constitution did not require that
juries impose capital sentences. 5 ' Strickland v. Washington 2 set demanding requirements for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases, 53 while Wainwright v. Witt 54 cut back on the

Witherspoon test for "death-qualifying" jurors.5 5 In Lockhart v. McCree 6 the Court rejected the important claim, which Witherspoon had
not foreclosed, that capital defendants were entitled to have their guilt
or innocence determined by juries from which nondeath qualified individuals had not been excluded. The Court made capital punishment

48. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
49. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion). For a comparison
of Gregg and Pulley, see supra note 1.
50. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
51. Spaziano expressly affirmed the constitutionality of a judge imposing a sentence of death
against the recommendation of an advisory jury that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed.
Id. at 449. The Supreme Court first approved Florida's capital sentencing scheme, and implicitly
the provision for judicial sentencing, in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
52. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
53. The two part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland
is as follows:
[A] "defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a
conviction of death sentence has two components." First, the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious that his performance as the "counsel" guaranteed under the [s]ixth
[a]mendment was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice because of counsel's performance. In the context of a capital sentence, the defendant must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant
death."
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 819 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 695 (1984)). Furthermore,
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting
for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and
it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). See generally Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary,62 WASH. U.L.Q. 573, 603-09 (1985); Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983); Tabak, The Death of
Fairness: The Arbitrary and CapriciousImposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 801-10 (1986).
54. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
55. See infra notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
56. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
57. See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
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available for a widened category of defendants convicted of felony mur58
der in Tison v. Arizona.
The coup de grace was delivered in 1987 in McCleskey v. Kemp,5 9
described by some critics and commentators as the last remaining systemic challenge to the death penalty on federal constitutional
grounds.6 0 The Court, by a vote of five to four, ruled that absent a
showing of invidious discrimination in a specific case, statistical evidence suggesting that racial discrimination generally influenced the administration of capital punishment did not establish a violation of a
capital defendant's rights on either equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment grounds. 6 1 McCleskey thus rejected the critically important contention that the formal changes made in post-Furman
capital punishment legislation had failed to correct the very defects in
the administration of the death penalty that had concerned the Justices
62
in Furman.
There were, to be sure, intermittent successes in the capital cases
decided by the Court in 1983 and subsequent years.6 s But opponents of
58. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). For further analysis
of these cases, see supra note 1; infra notes 269 & 271, and accompanying text.
59. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
60. See supra note 1.
61. McCleskey, a black man, had been convicted of the capital murder of a white police
officer, and sentenced to death. While challenging the legality of his death sentence, he introduced
testimony and evidence about a complex statistical study completed by Professor David Baldus
and his colleagues that suggested that the death penalty in Georgia was applied disproportionately
in homicide cases that involved white victims and, to a lesser extent, that involved black defendants. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION §§ 8.43-8.433 (Supp. 1987);
Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: CapitalPunishment by the Numbers-An Analysis
of McCleskey v. Kemp, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 454 (1987) (reviewing McCleskey and the data on which
it was premised).
62. One year after McCleskey was decided federal legislation was introduced in Congress
that would have the effect of countermanding much in the decision. The proposed Racial Justice
Act of 1988, H.R. 4442, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), specifies that broad based evidence of racial
discrimination, such as was at issue in McCleskey, prima facie establishes that capital punishment
within a state is being administered unlawfully and prohibits executions unless the apparent racial
disparities are explained on the basis of legally permissible factors.
63. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that
absent affirmative indication in a statute that the state legislature intended to allow the death
penalty for one who was only fifteen-years-old when he or she committed a capital crime, execution of such offender is cruel and unusual punishment under the federal constitution). But see
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (stating that no federal constitutional prohibition
against executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders exists); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987) (asserting that a failure to consider evidence of potentially mitigating circumstances
beyond those included in Florida's capital sentencing statute violates the federal constitution
under the rule of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion)); Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987) (finding that the admission of a victim impact statement at the capital sentencing
proceeding invites consideration of evidence that is irrelevant, and interjects an element of arbitrariness into the sentencing decision, in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (asserting that the improper exclusion of potentially
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capital punishment were not optimistic about their prospects before the
High Court and the lower federal courts which were bound to apply the
evolving death penalty doctrine.6 4 Coincidentally, as 1983 brought a significant turnabout in the results of capital cases decided by the Court,
the year marked an important impetus for litigants to pursue death
penalty challenges in alternative forums, the state courts, on nonfederal
grounds.
B. Independent and Adequate State Grounds
In Michigan v. Long65 the Justices clarified existing doctrine to the
effect that state court judgments are insulated from federal review if
they are founded upon independent and adequate state law grounds.
The Supreme Court had enunciated and relied upon the independent
and adequate state ground rule as early as 1875,6 premising the rule
upon both the Court's jurisdictional obligation to refrain from rendering advisory opinions and its respect for the sovereignty and autonomy
of state courts in nonfederal matters.6 7 Long merely spelled out the circumstances in which a state court's reference to and ostensible reliance
upon state decisional grounds foreclosed federal court review of a
judgment.6 8
mitigating evidence at the capital trial violates the rule of Lockett); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986) (ruling that it is cruel and unusual punishment under the federal constitution to exe-

cute one who lacks competence to be executed and that minimal procedures must be afforded to
examine the competency issue once fairly presented).
64. See generally Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the Federal Courts, 95 YALE L.J. 349 (1985).
65. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
66. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
67. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-42; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Minnesota v. National
Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
68. The Court stated:
[W]hen ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents
as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.. . . If
the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona
fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41 (1983). The effect of the rule is to create a presumption that federal law
has been applied absent a "plain statement" to the contrary by a state court. See id. at 1042. In
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the presumption should be in the other direction, i.e., that
state law governs a state court's decision absent some affirmative indication that federal grounds
were assumed to be controlling. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Abrahamson &
Guttman, The New Federalism: State Constitutions and State Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88, 96-98
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Long accelerated an existing trend for state courts to resort to the
constitutions and laws of their own states instead of to the federal constitution and federal precedent when deciding cases. This trend has
been one of the most important and fascinating jurisprudential developments in recent years. State courts' reliance upon state law to resolve
issues that also present federal questions is, in one sense, neither new
nor innovative. It is a stratagem, however, that was all but forgotten by
one generation of lawyers, and not learned by another, in the midst of
the Warren Court's nationalization of Federal Bill of Rights protections
during the 1960s.
From the time of the country's foundation until the ratification of
the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the United States Constitution imposed few constraints upon the states' administration of criminal law.69
The due process and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, of course, apply directly to the states,70 and the due process clause was significant in the Court's gradual assumption of control
over state criminal procedure matters. Even as this process gradually
began to develop, approximately from the early 1930s through the
1950s,7 ' the state courts generally were the first and final arbiters of
criminal prosecutions and appeals. The Warren Court, however, radically redefined the respective prominence of state and federal law. It
did so as the Justices systematically declared that almost all of the
rights relevant to criminal proceedings enumerated in the first eight
amendments to the federal constitution are binding in state cases by
operation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 2
(1987); Pollock, Adequate and Independent Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REv. 977, 980-82 (1985); Welsh, Reconsidering the
ConstitutionalRelationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1118 (1984).
69. The Supreme Court declared, in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), that the Federal Bill of Rights imposed no limitations upon the states.
The remainder of the federal constitution imposes only a few restraints on the states in criminal
matters. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art: I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws).
70. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See generally Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253, 281-90 (1982).
72. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (compelled self-incrimination); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) (search and seizure); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule). See generally Brennan, supra note 8, at 541-45. Israel,
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State courts, which collectively lacked the reputation of being
overly solicitous of criminal defendants' rights under state law, 73 consequently became either way stations to the federal courts or forums for
the enforcement of federal constitutional rights. Reliance upon state
constitutions, either by the litigants pressing claims or the courts deciding them, became a forgotten art.74 In death penalty litigation and in
other matters affecting individual liberties, federal constitutional law
dominated the judicial arena. This situation generally remains true,
given the profound and largely irreversible impact of the incorporation
movement upon the relationship between the state and federal courts. 75
Many changes, however, have occurred.
The Burger Court took form in the early 1970s7 6 and was widely
perceived as curtailing the scope of the federal constitutional rights
that had been recognized in the due process revolution of the 1960s.
Few still considered the United States Supreme Court to be "the
keeper of the nation's conscience.

' 77

After more than a decade of quies-

supra note 71, at 296-97.
73. Galie, State Supreme Courts, JudicialFederalismand the Other Constitutions,71 JUDICATURE 100, 100 (1987); Mosk, State Constitutionalism:Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1081, 1084 (1985). In a slightly different context, Professor Paulsen proclaimed in the early
1950s: "if our liberties are not protected in Des Moines the only hope is in Washington." Paulsen,
State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642
(1951).
74. According to one survey, state supreme courts recognized rights under state constitutions
in only three cases from 1950 to 1959, and in only seven cases from 1960 to 1969. They did so in
124 cases during the 1970s, and in 177 cases from 1980 to 1986. See Collins, Galie & Kincaid, supra
note 7, at 600-01 & table 1. The neglect of state constitutions during the heyday of the Warren
Court has left a definite legacy. Few law schools offer instruction in state constitutional history or
adjudication, and most casebooks in constitutional law ignore or give only superficial treatment to
state constitutions. See Collins, supra note 8, at 386-87; Collins, Galie & Kincaid, supra note 7, at
616-17; Galie, supra note 73, at 110 n.19 (describing treatment given state constitutions in principal constitutional law casebooks); Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 169, 227-28 (1983). State judges have complained that their law clerks typically are trained
in federal constitutional jurisprudence but not in state constitutional law. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt.
221, 223, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (1985). They acknowledged that "[t]he fact that law clerks working for
state judges have only been taught or are familiar with federal cases brings a federal bias to the
various states as they fan out after graduation from 'federally' oriented law schools. The lack of
treatises [or] textbooks developing the rich diversity of state constitutional law developments
could be viewed as an attempt to 'nationalize' the law and denigrate the state bench." Id. (quoting
Douglas, State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1123, 1147 (1978)). See generally Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496
ANNALS

33 (1988).

75. See Galie, supra note 73, at 102 (pointing out that given the tremendous significance of
the incorporation of Federal Bill of Rights protections to the states, there are no truly independent
models of state constitutional analysis).
76. Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice in 1969, and Justice Blackmun
assumed Justice Fortas's seat in 1970. See supra note 19. In early 1972 Justices Powell and Rehnquist were sworn in to take the seats vacated by Justices Harlan and Black.
77. Mosk, supra note 73, at 1087 (footnote omitted); see Wilkes, supra note 8, at 421; see
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cence that bordered on morbidity, the interest in state supreme courts
and state constitutional law experienced a remarkable reawakening. 8
A new relationship began to take shape between state and federal
constitutions. No longer were their protections considered in isolation,
as they had been in the distant past, nor were federal rights regarded as
preemptive or exclusive, as during the Warren Court years. Instead,
federal guarantees served as the floor beneath which the state courts
could not fall in recognizing constitutional protections. In many jurisdictions, new plateaus of state constitutional rights were established beyond the federal minima.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the state courts'
authority to recognize individual liberties under the aegis of state constitutional interpretation. These liberties may extend beyond the umbrella of federal constitutional protections.79 State courts have extended
them in approximately four hundred cases since 1970,80 many of which
have involved criminal law and criminal procedure issues.8 This trend
is likely to continue at an even faster pace as the doctrinal bases of
state constitutional interpretation take root and begin to expand. Also,
a reversal of the federal courts' increasing tendency toward conservative
also supra note 8.
78. See Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 MIss. L.J.
223, 228 (1984). Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court has noted that the interest
in state court adjudication has undergone a " 'phoenix-like resurrection.' "Id. (quoting TIME, Apr.
4, 1977, at 46, col. 3). This interest began being exhibited around 1970, and in 1977 Justice Brennan delivered an important address on state constitutional adjudication, which further stimulated
interest in the subject. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). Hundreds of articles have been written on various aspects of state
constitutional interpretation since then. See, e.g., Collins & Galie, State ConstitutionalLaw, supra
note 7, at S-9 to S-19.
79. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988) (stating that "[i]ndividual
States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution"); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14
(1983) (stating that "[i]t is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their
criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires"); PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (asserting that federal constitutional precedent "does not. . . limit
the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
[c]onstitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (stating that "a State is free as a matter of its
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards" (emphasis in original)).
80. See supra note 7.
81. See Collins & Galie, State ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 7, at S-9 to S-19 (collecting
cases); see also Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State ConstitutionalRights Law, 496 ANNALS 54
(1988). See generally Abrahamson, supra note 8; Gruhl, State Supreme Courts and the U. S.
Supreme Court's Post-MirandaRulings, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 886 (1981); Comment, Expansion of the Rights of Criminal Defendants Based on State Law, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 459 (1988);
Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 311.
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constitutional interpretation is not presently foreseeable.8 2
The state courts' increasing reliance on state constitutional grounds
to decide cases that once would have been considered solely under the
federal constitution and dictated by federal precedent has been described as "probably the most important development in constitutional
jurisprudence of our time.""3 It has been hailed as "a new 'Constitutional Revolution.' , Its rapid ascension to prominence, however, has
outpaced the general capabilities of the legal community. State judges
complain that lawyers fail to brief adequately state constitutional issues. 5 Law schools and casebooks are castigated for ignoring state con82. President Reagan, who appointed approximately half of the present federal court judges,
and largely succeeded in appointing conservative judges, see supra note 5, also appointed relatively
young judges, who are expected to have a long-term impact on federal court decision making. The
Judiciary:A Great Right Hope, supra note 5, at 23.
83. The Fourteenth Amendment, Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., American Bar
Association Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities, New York University Law School
(Aug. 8, 1986), quoted in Utter & Pitler, Presentinga State ConstitutionalArgument: Comment
on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REv. 635, 638 (1987).
84. See Williams, supra note 74, at 171; see also Collins, Galie & Kincaid, supra note 7, at
622 (stating that it is premature to label the return to state constitutional adjudication a "revolution" but noting the clear trend toward increased reliance on state constitutional decision making);
Pollock, supra note 68, at 979 (noting that "federal constitutional law has changed direction and,
once again, state constitutions are emerging as guarantees of fundamental rights"); Wilkes, supra
note 78, at 225 (identifying a "counterrevolution" in state courts' interpretation of constitutional
criminal procedure rights).
85. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1161 (noting that "all too frequently, counsel do
not raise state constitutional issues in the trial or appellate courts, or make only a passing reference to the state constitution" (footnote omitted)); Durham, Filling a Scholarly Void, NA'L L.J.,
Sept. 29, 1986, at S-6 (asserting that "when attorneys neglect to brief a pertinent legal point,
including a state constitutional one, they are flirting with malpractice"); Linde, E
Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 177 (1984) (noting that
attorneys often fail to brief state law issues); Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 653. Commentators
note:
State courts often observe that even where parties squarely raise state constitutional issues,
briefing frequently falls short of the mark, failing to make any substantive analysis or argument on the issue.. . . [L]awyers often view state issues as "throw-ins" most likely because
they have not learned how to frame well thought out, persuasive state constitutional
arguments.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (refusing to reach the state
constitutional issue because the parties neither raised nor briefed it); State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221,
500 A.2d 233 (1985) (remanding case for supplemental briefs to be filed on state constitutional
issue because the original briefs failed to address it adequately). The Jewett court took the rather
extraordinary step of advising lawyers about how to proceed generally to research and develop an
argument based upon state constitutional grounds. The opinion took an instructive and benevolent
tone but noted that: "Oregon Justice Hans Linde has stated: 'A lawyer today representing someone
who claims some constitutional protection and who does not argue that the state constitution provides that protection is skating on the edge of malpractice.'" Id. at 223, 500 A.2d at 234 (quoting
Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 CENTER MAG., Sept./Oct. 1981, at 12.
After Jewett was decided the Vermont Attorney General formed a special state constitutional law
commission, specifically to research history and legal precedent relevant to the Vermont Constitution. See Collins & Galie, supra note 7, at 335.
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stitutional law."6 Commentators are quick to identify judicial opinions
that give superficial treatment to state constitutional issues.8 7 Commentators tend to agree that state constitutions are once again important
jurisprudential documents and potential sources of rights, but there is
much uncertainty about the precise means with which they are to be
reckoned."8
C. Interpreting State Constitutions
Death penalty litigation under state constitutions has particularly
intriguing possibilities. The dynamic and troubled state of federal capital punishment jurisprudence invites the exploration of alternative doctrinal ground that is not dependent upon federal precedent.8 9
Additionally, whether or not state supreme courts adopt the federal analytical framework, the historical and empirical underpinnings of state
death penalty law must be specifically canvassed for individual states
and not measured against national practice and standards 0 The potential contributions that doctrinal innovations and empirical research can
make to the evolution of state Constitutional death penalty law are immeasurably greater than under federal constitutional law.
State supreme courts have adopted different approaches to state
constitutional analysis, characterized by differing philosophies about
86. See supra note 74.
87. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 8, at 375-76 (lamenting the frequency of selective, reactive,
result-oriented reliance upon state constitutions); Collins & Galie, 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at
320 (stating that "[a]lthough the state courts may one day get around to articulating coherent and
more complete bodies of state constitutional law, current jurisprudence in the criminal justice field
remains reactive and ad hoc"); Shapiro, State ConstitutionalDoctrine and the Criminal Process,
16 SETON HALL L. REV. 630, 647 (1986) (observing that one pattern of state constitutional decision
making "has been judicial reliance upon state constitutional law as a result-oriented, evasive technique for avoiding undesirable federal results and insulating a decision from federal review" and
that this approach is rightly criticized as unprincipled and lacking in normative legitimacy).
88. Linde, supra note 85, at 166 (noting that "[tihe question in the state courts no longer is
whether to give independent attention to state constitutional issues, but how"); Developments in
the Law: The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1329 (1982)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law] (noting that while it is apparent that state bill of right
guarantees "may once again assume a prominent role, there is little consensus on what that role
should be").
89. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text; cf. Jewett, 146 Vt. at 223, 500 A.2d at
235. In the course of directing that supplemental briefs be filed in an appeal presenting a search
and seizure question, to address state constitutional argument, the court mused that "[o]ne longs
to hear once again of legal concepts, their meaning and their origin. All too often legal argument
consists of a litany of federal buzz words memorized like baseball cards." Id.
90. It sometimes is argued that in contexts such as search and seizure or compulsory selfincrimination law, state court adherence to federal doctrine is desirable to avoid a proliferation of
rules that may be unduly confusing to law enforcement officers. There would seem to be no analogous need for uniformity in state capital punishment law in which diversification by the states may
be particularly appropriate. Devine, Feldman, Giles-Klein, Ingram & Williams, Special Project:
The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty in New Jersey, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 261, 323-24 (1984).
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the respective centrality of the state and federal constitutions in their
decision making. One style, essentially a "non-approach"' ' insofar as
state constitutions are concerned, uses interpretations of the federal
constitution to dictate the meaning of analogous state constitutional
provisions. This style is called the lock-step, or equivalence, model of
state constitutional interpretation. 2 A provision in the Florida Constitution explicitly requires such coincidence between the scope and
meaning of state and federal rights."3 State courts have expressly
adopted the lock-step approach on occasion, 4 while many decisions do
so de facto.95
At the opposite end of the relational spectrum is the primacy
model, under which state constitutions routinely are consulted before
the federal constitution and are considered exclusively if they adequately resolve the contested issue.9" This approach, more than any
91. Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 645.
92. See Galie, supra note 73, at 102; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 645-46. Under this
approach,
U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court decisions are automatically presumed to establish the contours and character of state constitutional law. In its most extreme form, this model dictates
. . .that a particular state constitutional provision always be interpreted in the same way as
the U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court would interpret a parallel federal provision ...
Adherents of the equivalence model deny that state judges have any independent responsibility to be the caretakers of state law. Practically speaking, for them, state bills or declarations of rights have no functional significance . . . . Thus, the role of state judges in
"interpreting" state law is to hypothesize how the U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court might
rule on a given question. In practice, under the equivalence model there is little, if any, difference between a state court's interpretations of either the federal or state constitution.
Collins & Galie, 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 323-24 (footnotes omitted). For a defense of this
approach to state constitutional interpretation, see Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of
Federalism, 496 ANNALS 98 (1988).
93. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12. This section provides:
[The state constitution's search and seizure provision] shall be construed in conformity with
the [fourth] [a]mendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be
admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the [fourth] [a]mendment to the United
States Constitution.
Id. Former Chief Justice Burger applauded this provision by stating that "when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state
must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement.
The people of Florida have now done so . . . ." Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (per
curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
94. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983); Brown v. State, 657
S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The Montana Supreme Court subsequently retreated
from its position of conforming to United States Supreme Court doctrine. See State v. Johnson,
221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986); see also Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-TheMontana Disaster, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1095, 1137 (1985); Collins & Galie, supra note 7, at 323; Utter &
Pitler, supra note 83, at 646.
95. Galie, supra note 73, at 102; see also infra note 151 and accompanying text.
96. One commentator explained:
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other, promotes the independent development of state constitutional
doctrine without preordaining that state law will provide equivalent,
greater, or fewer protections9 7 than the federal constitution. State
courts adhering to the primacy model interpret and apply federal law in
the event that a case is not decided on state grounds. 98
The interstitial, or supplemental, approach reverses the presumptions inherent in the primacy model. State courts normally rely on the
federal constitution and federal precedent to resolve cases and resort to
state constitutional analysis only if federal grounds are not dispositive.
Parallel provisions in the federal and state constitutions typically are
assumed to afford similar protections unless specific considerations milThe primacy model focuses on the state constitution as an independent source of rights and
relies on it as the fundamental law. Under the primacy model, federal law and analysis are
not presumptively correct. In fact, they are no more persuasive than the decisions of sister
state courts. Consequently, even when a developed body of federal doctrine is available, and
the state and federal texts are similar, the primacy model urges that the court look first to the
state provision and to state history, doctrine, and structure. Its examination of these statespecific concerns may lead it to a result that diverges from the preexisting federal interpretation. Only if the result grounded in state law falls below the standards of the federal constitution should the court decide the case under federal law. In short, the primacy model relegates
federal law to a secondary position.
Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile:State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional
Issues When Disposing of Cases on State ConstitutionalGrounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1028
(1985) (footnotes omitted); see also Pollock, supra note 68, at 983. "Under the primacy approach,
a court looks first to its state constitution . . . . Only if the alleged infringement is permissible
under state constitutional standards would a court consult the federal constitution." Id.; Utter &
Pitler, supra note 83, at 647; Comment, The Primacy Method of State ConstitutionalDecisionmaking: Interpretingthe Maine Constitution, 38 ME. L. REV. 491 (1986). Oregon Supreme Court
Justice Hans Linde has been a long time and influential proponent of the primacy approach to
state constitutional interpretation. See Linde, supra note 85, at 178-79; Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980). A few state courts have
adopted the primacy approach in their state constitutional decision making. See State v. Flick, 495
A.2d 339, 343 n.2 (Me. 1985); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); State v. Ball, 124 N.H.
226, 230-32, 471 A.2d 347, 350-52 (1983); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262-63, 666 P.2d 1316,
1318 (1983); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
97. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court has ruled in a plurality decision that the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are not also required under the state
constitution. See State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 894 (1986) (plurality decision). Commentators have labeled state supreme courts' practice of interpreting state constitutions to provide fewer
protections than analogous federal constitutional provisions an "equivalence minus" model of interpretation. See Collins & Galie, 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 327; Galie, supra note 73, at 10203.
98. The major criticisms of this approach are that the law will lack uniformity and create
confusion among law enforcement officers and others who must abide by judicial interpretations of
constitutional protections, and that failing to recognize the dominance of federal constitutional law
in the present era of federalism is unrealistic. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1177; Maltz,
The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tsx. L. REV. 995, 1005 (1985); Utter & Pitler, supra
note 83, at 648 n.108; Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1357; see also State v. Ringer,
100 Wash. 2d 688, 703, 674 P.2d 1240, 1250 (1983) (Dimmick, J., dissenting), overruled by State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
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itate in favor of construing the state constitution differently." This approach sometimes appears to be result oriented, or an ad hoc approach
to state constitutional interpretation, 100 although it need not be. 10 In
practice most state courts appear to utilize this technique when relying
upon state constitutions.'
99. See Utter, supra note 96, at 1028-29. Utter states:
According to the interstitial model state courts recognize the federal doctrine as the floor and
focus the inquiry on whether the state constitution offers a means of supplementing or amplifying federal rights .

. .

. Although the result reached under federal law is presumptively

correct, a state could adopt an original interpretation of a state constitutional provision by
examining textual differences, legislative history supporting a broader reading of the state
provision, state law predating United States Supreme Court decisions, differences between
federal and state judicial structures, subject matter of particular state or local interest, state
tradition, and public attitudes in the state.
* * . The interstitial approach treats the federal rule as presumptively correct; the court
will follow federal law if it finds federal law establishes the right in question. If the court finds
no federal right, it will next determine if there are reasons, such as state-specific factors, to
supplement the federal doctrine.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Three questions must be addressed sequentially by state courts that adopt
the interstitial model of state constitutional interpretation:
First, do established principles of federal law dictate a result; that is, does the alleged unconstitutional action fall below a federal floor? If so, the case can be decided without the elaboration of state constitutional doctrine. If not, the second question asks what factors, if any,
warrant a divergence from federal doctrine. If the court identifies reasons to diverge, the final
question is how to proceed in elaborating the contours of the state constitutional doctrine;
specifically, should the court employ a reactive approach, simply tinkering with the available
federal doctrine, or should it employ a more self-reliant approach, building state constitutional doctrine for this area independently, without close reference to the federal doctrine?
Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1358 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see
also Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1171-73; Pollock, supra note 68, at 984-85; Utter & Pitler, supra
note 83, at 648-51.
100. See Collins, supra note 8, at 375 n.15; Collins & Galie, 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at
320; Linde, supra note 85, at 196. A criticism of constitutional interpretation is that:
Text can confine a judicial interpretation when it cannot compel one. Judicial review can be
not only interpretive or noninterpretive but misinterpretive. A long buried grub surprisingly
metamorphoses into a butterfly and remains the same insect, and an underwater tadpole
turns into an airbreathing frog; but some decisions have made butterflies grow from tadpoles,
to the applause of theorists who prefer butterflies. There are limits to what can be explained
as constitutional law before turning it into genetic engineering.
Id.; see Shapiro, supra note 87, at 647-49.
101. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 365-68, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring). The court identified several considerations that may be relevant to the development of standards or criteria to justify divergent interpretations of analogous state and federal constitutional
provisions: (1)differences in textual language, (2) legislative history of constitutional provisions, (3)
reference to state law that existed prior to the state constitution, (4) structural differences between
state and federal constitutions, (5) matters of particular state interest or local concern, (6) state
traditions, and (7) distinctive public attitudes. Id.; see also State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d
233, 236-37 (1985) (identifying the considerations generally relevant to state constitutional interpretation); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts:JudicialActivism Among State Supreme Courts, 33
SYRACUSE L. REv. 731 (1982); Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv. 353, 385-88 (1984); Developments
in the Law, supra note 88, at 1359-62.
102. Shapiro, supra note 87, at 647; see Collins & Galie, 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 324-25
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A few state courts use a dual sovereignty analysis, routinely considering claims under both state and federal constitutional provisions.103
This approach recognizes the relevance of both state and federal constitutional law to state jurisprudence. The perceived virtue of the dual
sovereignty approach is its acknowledgement of the basic federalistic
structure of the American judicial system.104 It has been criticized as
inviting unnecessary work and confusion in both state and federal
courts and for spawning advisory opinions that are not necessary to
0 5
case decisions.1

Most state courts eclectically select their means for reaching issues
under state constitutions and do not commit to any specific mode of
analysis. Once they begin to consider state constitutional provisions,
however, most state courts must be convinced that they should not follow analogous federal constitutional precedent even if they are not required to do so. 06s This attitude springs from habit, owing much to both
postincorporation dominance of federal law and the reasoned expectation that the fundamental law of both the state and federal sovereigns
10 7
has similar origins and purposes that will command similar results.
(referring to this approach as the "equivalence plus" model of state constitutional interpretation).
103. See Utter, supra note 96, at 1029 (noting that "[t]he dual sovereignty method. . . analyzes both the state and federal constitutional provisions"). State courts often use this approach
even when a case may be resolved without it. Id. (finding that "[c]ourts applying the dual sovereignty model always evaluate both federal and state provisions in the course of their decisions,
even when the decision rests firmly on state grounds"); see also Abrahamson, supra note 8, at
1170-71; Collins, supra note 8, at 393 n.68; Pollock, supra note 68, at 983. For cases using the dual
sovereignty analysis, see State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984);
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d
336 (1982); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
104. For commentary in defense of the dual sovereignty model, see Utter, supra note 96, at
1030-45; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 651-52.
105. See Utter, supra note 96, at 1029-30; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 652. See generally Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-39 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that the state court's failure to examine state grounds for the decision independently of federal grounds caused needless work for both the state supreme court and the
United States Supreme Court).
106. This trend is not true of state courts that follow the primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation, which entails consulting the state constitution initially to determine claims
and carries no presumption that federal constitutional precedent generally ought to control. See
Linde, supra note 85, at 179. Under the primacy approach,
[tihe crucial step for counsel and for state courts . . . is to recognize that the Supreme
Court's answer is not presumptively the right answer, to be followed unless the state court
explains why not.
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as or broader than its
federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question is what the
state's guarantee means and how it applies to the case at hand.
Id.; see also supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 362-63, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring). Judge Handler advised that:
our national judicial history and traditions closely wed federal and state constitutional doc-
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Identifying textual differences between state and federal constitutions seems perhaps the easiest way to overcome such a presumption.
There is absolutely no reason that compels even identically worded
state and federal provisions to be interpreted the same.108 Nonetheless,
the legitimacy of state courts premising decisions upon state constitutions is most apparent and least often questioned when different substantive provisions, 10 9 or significantly different statements of rights,"10
trine. It is not entirely realistic, sound or historically accurate to regard the separation between the federal and state systems as a schism . . . [A] considerable measure of
cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist system ....
[W]hile a natural [sic] monolithic legal system is not contemplated, some consistency and uniformity between the state
and federal governments in certain areas of judicial administration is desirable.
Id.; see also Pollock, supra note 68, at 984; Shapiro, supra note 87, at 647; Williams, supra note
101, at 389-96; Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1357. See generally Maltz, supra note
92.
108. See Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practiceand Principle, 42 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y.
285, 299 (1987). In this address the author, a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, answered in
the negative to the question, "Does the absence of textual difference in comparable provisions [of
the federal and state constitutions] preclude principled independent analysis under the state Constitution?" Id. She continued:
As a juridical act . . . constitutional analysis by state courts cannot stop with a mechanical
matching of texts; significant protections of a state constitution are otherwise relegated to
redundancy.
In this State, in fact, there is a long tradition of reading the parallel clauses independently and affording broader protection, where appropriate, under the state Constitution.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1348 (indicating that
"even when confronted with identical federal and state constitutional language, a state court has a
different, more expansive role to play in applying its version of the provision"). Other commentators argue that whether or not there are language similarities between federal and state constitutions, it is important to
overcome the notion that the divergence from the Supreme Court becomes more legitimate
when the state constitution has different text. In either case, state courts have equal responsibility for independently interpreting their state constitutions; a textual difference simply
makes it easier for a court to see its responsibility.
Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 656 (footnote omitted); see also Linde, supra note 85, at 182
(stating that state supreme courts must make independent analyses of state constitutional provisions whether or not federal provisions are worded identically).
109. E.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (relying upon the Alaska Constitution's
right of privacy provision, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22, to recognize the right to possess a small
quantity of marijuana in one's home). Many other state constitutions also explicitly recognize the
right of privacy. See Galie, supra note 73, at 103; Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights Law, 496 ANNALS 54, 55 (1988). The constitutions of several states prohibit discrimination based upon gender. See Galie, supra note 101, at 745-48; Tarr & Porter, Gender Equality
and JudicialFederalism:The Role of State Appellate Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919 (1982);
Williams, Equality Guarantees in State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195 (1985). Many
also have special provisions for public school financing and education generally. See Galie, supra
note 101, at 748-51; Maltz, supra note 98, at 1021; Mosk, supra, at 56-57; Developments in the
Law, supra note 88, at 1444-59. But see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (upholding and refusing to scrutinize strictly public education financing by local property
taxes with resulting unequal distribution of financial assistance to public school systems across the
state).
110. Compare MD. CONST. art. XXI (guaranteeing unanimous criminal trial jury) with John-
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distinguish the state and federal documents. State and federal constitutional protections relevant to capital punishment sometimes exhibit
such differences.
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
simply that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 11 ' The constitutions of fifteen of the thirty-six states that inflict capital punishment
have virtually identical prohibitions against "cruel and unusual punishments." 11 2 An additional fourteen proscribe cruel "or" unusual punishments, 1 13 five bar only "cruel"
punishments," 4 and two have no
15
analogous textual provisions.

1

It is disputable whether a disjunctive prohibition against cruel "or"
unusual punishments deserves a different interpretation from the
eighth amendment's conjunctive statement,16 or whether "unusual"
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (both announcing that the federal constitution does not prohibit the states from using nonunanimous criminal
juries); CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 16 and W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (requiring 12-member criminal juries)
with Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (announcing that the federal constitution does not
preclude states from utilizing six-member juries in criminal trials). The Oregon Constitution states
that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the
abuse of this right." OR. CONST. art I, § 8. The Oregon Supreme Court interpreted this provision to
prohibit the regulation of "obscene" materials with respect to adults. See State v. Henry, 302 Or.
510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987). But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
111. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
112. ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, para. 17; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONsT. art. I, § 16; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 22; NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 12; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 16; TENN. CONsT. art I, § 16; UTAH CONsT. art. I, § 9; VA CONsT. art. I, § 9. But see
OL CONST. art. I, § 40; infra note 117 and accompanying text.
113. ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 15; ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 17; FLA. CONsT. art.
1, § 17; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20; MD.CONsT. art. 25 (Declaration of Rights); id. art. 16 (Declaration
of Rights) (stating that "no law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made
in any case, or at any time, hereafter"); Miss. CONsT. art 3, § 28; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 6; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 33; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 27; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 9; S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 15
(specifying that neither "cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted (emphasis
added)); Tx. CONST. art. 1, § 13; WYO.CONST. art. 1, § 14. But see CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 27; N.C.
CONsT. art. XI, § 2; infra note 118 and accompanying text.
114. DEL. CONsT. art. I, § 11; Ky. CONST. § 17 (Bill of Rights); PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; S.D.
CONsT. art. V, § 23; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
115. The constitutions of Connecticut and Illinois do not contain prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishments. But see ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11; infra text accompanying note 124.
116. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634-39, 493 P.2d 880, 883-87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
155-59, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (attributing significance to the textual prohibition against
cruel "or" unusual punishments in CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 17 (formerly CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6) in
finding the death penalty to be violative of the state constitution, although ultimately concluding
that capital punishment was both cruel "and" unusual); Galie, supra note 101, at 761 (calling
Anderson "one of the most striking, if not altogether convincing, decisions to use textual differences as grounds for differing with federal constitutional law"). See generally Barrett, Anderson
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adds anything of meaning to the protection against "cruel" punishments. 117 These disputes illustrate the point that differently worded
provisions may at least provide a logical point of departure in the quest
to have different interpretations placed upon state and federal constitutions. This point is most obvious under the constitutions of the four
states that affirmatively sanction capital punishment, or exempt it from
prohibition under other constitutional provisions." 8 It would be fruitand the JudicialFunction, 45 S. CAL.L. REv. 739 (1972); Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S.CAL. L. REv.750 (1972).
117. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall stated:
[U]se of the word "unusual" in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was inadvertent, and there
is nothing in the history of the [e]ighth [a]mendment to give flesh to its intended meaning. In
light of the meager history that does exist, one would suppose that an innovative punishment
would probably be constitutional if no more cruel than that punishment which it superseded.
Id. at 331. Discussing precedent that has alluded to "unusual" punishments, Justice Brennan
concluded that " '[w]hether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different from
"cruel" is not clear.' The question, in any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never
attempted to explicate the meaning of the [eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments]
[c]lause simply by parsing its words." Id. at 277 n.20 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted);
see also Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 73-75, 454 A.2d 937, 967-68 (1982) (holding
"that the rights secured by the Pennsylvania prohibition against 'cruel punishments' are co-extensive with those secured by the [e]ighth and [ffourteenth [a]mendments"), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
970 (1983); H. BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT* STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 96-98 (1987); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).

118. Article 1, Section 27 of the California Constitution states:
All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972, requiring, authorizing, imposing,
or relating to the death penalty are in full force and effect, subject to legislative amendment
or repeal by statute, initiative, or referendum.
The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to
constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning of Article 1,
Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other
provision of this constitution.
(Former article 1, § 6 now is article 1, § 17 of the California Constitution). The relevant provision
in the Massachusetts Constitution states:
No magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive
fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments. No provision of the Constitution, however, shall
be construed as prohibiting the imposition of punishment of death. The general court may,
for the purpose of protecting the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the imposition of
the punishment of death by the courts of law having jurisdiction of crimes subject to the
punishment of death.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26. Massachusetts' death penalty legislation was declared violative of state

constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination and to trial by jury in Commonwealth v.
Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 470 N.E.2d 116 (1984); see also N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (stating that
"[t]he objects of punishments being not only to satisfy justice, but also to reform the offender and
thus prevent crime, murder, arson, burglary, and rape, and these only, may be punishable with
death, if the General Assembly shall so enact"); OR. CONST. art. I, § 40 (proclaiming that
"[n]otwithstanding sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the penalty for aggravated murder as defined
by law shall be death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings as provided by law and otherwise
shall be life imprisonment with minimum sentence as provided by law"). Prior to its revision in
1972, the Montana Constitution provided: "Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on
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less to argue that the death penalty is per se invalid on state grounds in
the face of such textual affirmations, even though other challenges
might survive. 119
Some states have constitutional protections that arguably are relevant to the death penalty and have no textual analogue in the federal
constitution. For example, an Indiana provision states that "[t]he penal
code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.' 120 The Oregon Constitution contains a nearly identical
clause,'12 although a 1984 amendment that resulted from a voters' initiative specifically excepted the death penalty from its terms.' 1 2 Wyoming's constitution specifies that "[t]he penal code shall be framed on
the humane principles of reformation and prevention.' ' 23 The Illinois
Constitution provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of re'2 4
storing the offender to useful citizenship.'
Because capital punishment is patently incompatible with reformation and restoration, and to some observers has trappings of vindictiveness, 125 courts could interpret these provisions as outright prohibitions
the principles of reformation and prevention, but this shall not affect the power of the legislative
assembly to provide for punishing offenses by death." MONT. CONsT. art. III, § 24. The clause
making reference to the death penalty subsequently was deleted. See id. art. II, § 28; see also infra
note 124.
119. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 81, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1982) (holding that article 1, § 27 of the California Constitution "does not, on its face, preclude
review [of death penalty issues] on state due process grounds"). The court also concluded that one
of the aggravating factors in the capital punishment legislation, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14)
(Deering 1985), was unconstitutionally vague and violative of state and federal due process provisions. Id.; see also Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. at 150, 470 N.E.2d at 116; State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126,
137-38, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811-12 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting) (arguing that using a "death qualified" jury at the guilt determination stage of a capital trial violates the state constitutional right to
trial by jury); State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988) (considering but rejecting the
claim that a guilty plea in a capital case was impermissible under the state constitution), vacated
on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989).

120.

IND. CONST.

art. 1, § 18.

121. OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (providing that "[lI]aws for the punishment of crime shall be
founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice"). The drafters of the Oregon Constitution drew heavily upon the Indiana Constitution. Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at
635-36. See generally Kanter, Dealing with Death: The Constitutionalityof Capital Punishment
in Oregon, 16 WILLAMEFE L. RE V. 1, 47-52 (1979).
122. OR. CONST. art. I, § 40; see supra note 118; see also Wagner, 305 Or. at 136-39, 752 P.2d
at 1150-52; Waldo, The 1984 Death Penalty Initiatives: A State ConstitutionalAnalysis, 22 WiLLAMEmTE L. REv. 285 (1986).
123. WYo. CONsT. art. 1, § 15.
124. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11; see also MONT. CoNST. art. II, § 28 (stating that "[l]aws for the
punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of prevention and reformation").
125. See Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 64, 76-77, 271 N.E.2d 425, 432 (1971) (DeBruler, J., dissenting in part) (vacating the death penalty), rev'd in part on reh'g, 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757
(1972); Wagner, 305 Or. at 212-13, 752 P.2d at 1196 (Linde, J., dissenting).
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against the death penalty. 126 In the states in which such challenges have
been made, however, literal textual readings have given way to other
"interpretivist" techniques of constitutional construction. 12 7 Historical
and other considerations have led state supreme courts to reject such
128
attacks upon capital punishment.
Death penalty challenges almost inevitably revolve around more
than textual, historical, and other matters that shed light upon the intent of the constitutional framers. They require "noninterpretivist"
analysis, through which courts attempt to assess and effectuate contemporary values in the promotion of important social policies, traditions,
and attitudes.'2 9 The analytical framework surrounding the eighth
126. See supra notes 118 & 121. Circumstantial evidence in support of this proposition may
be found in the provisions of the Oregon Constitution. Article I, § 15 requires that principles of
reformation and not vindictive justice guide penal laws, and article I, § 16 prohibits cruel and
unusual punishments. In 1984 the constitution was amended specifically to exempt the death penalty from these provisions. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 40; see also Wagner, 305 Or. at 136-39, 752 P.2d
at 1150-52; id. at 212-14, 752 P.2d at 1195-96 (Linde, J., dissenting).
127. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302-03, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). In P.J. Video the court asserted:
One basis for relying on the State Constitution arises from an interpretive review of its provisions. If the language of the State Constitution differs from that of its [flederal counterpart,
then the court may conclude that there is a basis for a different interpretation of it. Such an
analysis considers whether the textual language of the State Constitution specifically recognizes rights not enumerated in the Federal Constitution; whether language in the State Constitution is sufficiently unique to support a broader interpretation of the individual right
under State law; whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an intention to make
the [s]tate provision coextensive with, or broader than, the parallel [flederal provision; and
whether the very structure and purpose of the State Constitution serves to expressly affirm
certain rights rather than merely restrain the sovereign power of the State.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Kaye, supra note 108, at 317 n.57; Maltz, supra
note 98, at 1000; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 658; Note, supra note 81, at 344, 346.
128. See Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098
(1986); Adams, 259 Ind. at 72-74, 271 N.E.2d at 429-30; see also Wagner, 305 Or. at 136-39, 752
P.2d at 150-52 (construing OR. CONsT. art. I, § 40 to supersede the constitutional prohibition requiring reformation and against vindictive justice); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 63-64 (Wyo.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983), appeal after remand, 679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1984), denial of
sentence modification aff'd, 704 P.2d 1323 (Wyo. 1988). There apparently have been no direct
challenges to the death penalty under the Illinois constitutional provision, see text accompanying
note 124, perhaps in part because the commentary accompanying this section reflects that several
legislators, prior to its introduction, affirmed in statements that it was not intended to abolish the
death penalty.
129. See P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911 (1986). The
court contended:
[Nloninterpretivereview proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness. A noninterpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any preexisting [s]tate statutory or common law defining the scope of the individual right in question; the
history and traditions of the [s]tate in its protection of the individual right; any identification
of the right in the State Constitution as being one of peculiar [s]tate or local concern; and any
distinctive attitudes of the [s]tate citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the
individual right.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Kaye, supra note 108, at 317 n.57; Maltz, supra
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amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause is heavily dependent upon such analysis, given the central place that "evolving standards of decency" occupy in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 1 0
This concept has been given partial content through a number of measures that reflect public attitudes about capital punishment-most importantly, legislation, death penalty decisions made by juries and
judges, the regularity of executions, and historical data.1 31
The Supreme Court has drawn upon national data in attempting to
assess public attitudes about capital punishment. This practice immediately distinguishes death penalty decisions based upon the eighth
amendment from those premised on state constitutional grounds. Even
if state courts are guided by the doctrinal analysis now associated with
the eighth amendment, their frame of reference for measuring "evolving
standards of decency" must be within state borders instead of the country as a whole. Public attitudes about capital punishment and the historical use of the death penalty may be significantly different in
Massachusetts, for example, than in Georgia.1 3
note 98, at 1001; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 658-60; Note, supra note 81, at 346.
130. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that
"the [e]ighth [a]mendment has not been regarded as a static concept"). "As Mr. Chief Justice
Warren said, in an oft-quoted phrase, '[tihe Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
131. Id. at 179-82; see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97
(1977) (plurality opinion).
132. Georgia has conducted more lawful executions since 1930, when national statistics began
being maintained, than any other state: approximately 366 persons from 1930 to 1967, and an
additional 13 since 1977, when executions resumed, or a total of 379. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra
note 3, at 3; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JusTiCE STATisTIcs-1977, table 6.100,
at 705 (1978) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. Georgia's early history of capital punishment included
explicit statutory discriminations based upon race. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328-30
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan noted:
This historical review of Georgia criminal law is not intended as a bill of indictment
calling the State to account for past transgressions. . . .But it would be unrealistic to ignore
the influence of history in assessing the plausible implications of McCleskey's evidence [concerning racial influences in Georgia's capital punishment system].
Id. at 332. In contrast, Massachusetts had executed only 27 people between 1930 and 1967.
SOURCEBOOK, supra, table 6.100, at 705. No one had been executed in Massachusetts between 1948
and 1972, when Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) invalidated almost all death penalty legislation in the country. This fact was seized upon as a critical fact in the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court's subsequent conclusion that capital punishment was "cruel or unusual" under the
state constitution:
From the beginning of 1948 until the end of 1972 . . . no person was executed in this
[c]ommonwealth. The death sentences of forty-three persons were commuted or reduced by
executive action. The complete absence of executions in the [c]ommonwealth through these
many years indicates that in the opinion of those several Governors and others who bore the
responsibility for administering the death penalty provisions and who had the most immediate appreciation of the death sentence, it was unacceptable.
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Factual issues are relevant to much of death penalty jurispru13 4
dence, 3' ranging from the deterrent efficacy of the capital sanction,
District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 662, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (1980) (citation omitted);
see also Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 275, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (1975) (Hennessey, J.,
concurring). Members of other supreme courts who have opined that capital punishment was per
se violative of state constitutional provisions have focused on state specific data concerning the
frequency of the administration of the death penalty. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 65253, 493 P.2d 880, 896-98, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 168-69, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972); Adams, 259
Ind. at 87, 271 N.E.2d at 437-38 (DeBruler J., dissenting in part); State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126,
135-36 (Tenn.) (Brock, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632
P.2d 79, 207-09 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).

133. See, e.g., W. BOWERS,

LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH

As

PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,

1864-1982, at

xxiii (1984). The author asks:
[I]s death an acceptable punishment? People passionately disagree over the death penalty and advance their arguments as self-evident and morally compelling. . . . Yet the death
penalty's acceptability is very much an empirical question. This is so because the [e]ighth
[a]mendment to our Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment, and because the
courts have translated this general standard into three specific tests: its fairness of application, its utility as a deterrent, and its compatibility with contemporary values-all tests that
lend themselves to empirical evaluation.
Id. But see Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: EmpiricalInquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW
IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56, 66 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). Kalven asserted:
Belief about the death penalty in the end will rest not on oblique evidence as to its capacity
to deter, nor on public opinion polls of community conscience, nor on proof of the difficulties
it creates in selecting a representative jury, nor finally in the awkwardness of selecting from
among those the legislature has made eligible for the death penalty the few who are in fact to
die. Conviction will turn on something harder to reach with prosaic facts-the ugliness and
cruelty of the cool, deliberate killing of another human being.
Id.
134. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-86. The Gregg plurality cited Professor Ehrlich's famous
study, which concluded that each execution in this country prevented, on the average, seven or
eight criminal homicides from being committed. Id. at 184-85 n.31 (citing Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975)).
Ehrlich's research was based on national homicide and execution rates and other national data
rather than being specific to any single state. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 234-35 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment

of the Evidence, in

DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978); Zeisel, The Deterrent

Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faith,1973 Sup. CT. REV. 317. Some studies have focused on
the efficacy of capital punishment to deter criminal homicides within specific states, and have
found no significant deterrent effects. See, e.g., Bailey, An Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1979); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death
Penalty for Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67 (1979); Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of
the Death Penalty for Murder in Ohio: A Time-Series Analysis, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1979);
Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder in California,52 S. CAL. L. REV. 743
(1979); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty for Murder in Utah: A Time-Series Analysis, 5
J. CoNTEMP. L. 1 (1978). Of further interest is Bowers' and Pierce's study of capital punishment in
New York from 1907 through 1964 (one year after the last lawful execution in the state). Instead of
finding evidence that executions deterred homicide in New York, they found evidence of a "brutalization" effect or that executions actually inspired the commission of criminal homicides. On the
average the presence of one or more executions in a given month was found to add two homicides
to the number committed in the next month. See Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization:
What Is the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980).
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to its allegedly discriminatory application, 13 5 to whether death qualification procedures are likely to exclude significant portions of a population from jury service in capital trials. 136 When they arise in conjunction
with state constitutional challenges to the death penalty, factual issues
must be investigated with specific reference to the state in question. It
would be hazardous to assume that information compiled and aggregated from a country as richly diverse as the United States accurately
describes the administration and impact of capital punishment in any
137
single state.
135. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness
and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Gross
& Mauro, Patternsof Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparitiesin Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984); KIeck, RacialDiscriminationin Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46
AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981); Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to
Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina,74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Radelet,
Racial Characteristicsand the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918 (1981);
Radelet & Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretionin Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 587
(1985); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The FloridaExperience, 95
HARV. L. REv. 456 (1981).
136. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, (1986); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1,
616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). In Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983),
the case that began the litigation that culminated with Lockhart, the court noted that approximately 14% of the Arkansas jury-eligible population was excludable for cause from capital jury
service under Witherspoon. Id. at 1294, 1308. In Witherspoon the trial judge, applying a standard
disapproved by the Supreme Court, excused for cause 47 prospective jurors, or nearly half of the
venire, because of their views about capital punishment. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
513-14 (1968). See generally Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification
on Jurors'Predispositionto Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation,8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53
(1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualificationand Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 31 (1984).
137. See generally People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907 (1986). The court rejected on state constitutional grounds the test for evaluating probable
cause as adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in a case in which a search warrant
issued for seizure of allegedly obscene material. The New York Court of Appeals observed:
[O]bscenity cases differ from other crimes because, by definition, they are predicated on contemporary community standards ....
But the work is not criminally obscene unless so
judged when applying contemporary community standards. The parameters of the "community" whose standard is to be applied are not only nonnational, but also are to be defined
according to [s]tate law. Thus, New York law requires the magistrate, or the finder of fact at
trial, to determine the average New Yorker's evaluation of, and reaction to, the challenged
material. This perception of "the average New Yorker" involves a mix of factors peculiar to
this [s]tate, including our legal traditions and our cultural and historical position as a leader
in the educational, scientific and artistic life of our country, as well as a recognition that New
York is a [s]tate where freedom of expression and experimentation has not only been tolerated, but encouraged.
Id. at 308-09, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16. The parallel between obscenity and death
penalty cases and the use of "contemporary community standards" in each certainly is not precise,
although it has been suggested. See Kanter, supra note 121, at 54 n.216. The more general point is
that assessment of the death penalty under state constitutions may depend upon facts, circumstances, and traditions specific to a state rather than to national data. Id. at 54. See generally
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Resolution of claims under the federal constitution differs in other
significant respects from state constitutional analysis. United States Supreme Court decisions become the fundamental law in all fifty states
and historically have been difficult to countermand by constitutional
amendment. 8' These decisions must be framed appropriately to allow
for such general and lasting application. 39
State court decisions based on state constitutional grounds bind
only persons within the state's jurisdiction, and such decisions do not
inhibit related experimentation by other states. 140 Unlike the United
Maltz, supra note 98, at 1019-20; Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1349-50, 1361-62 &

n.148.
138. There have been only 26 amendments to the federal constitution in its 200 years of
existence. A few of the amendments have come in response to unpopular Supreme Court decisions.
The eleventh amendment followed the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793) (granting federal court jurisdiction over a citizen's suit filed against another state); the sixteenth amendment overrode Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (assessing
the constitutionality of the federal income tax); the twenty-sixth amendment gave eighteen-yearolds the power to vote, after the Supreme Court had invalidated a federal statute to that same
effect in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Also the twenty-first amendment repealed the
eighteenth amendment (prohibition). State constitutions are much more frequently amended than
the federal constitution. See infra notes 143, 144, and accompanying text.
139. Kaye, supra note 108, at 303. The record states:
[T]he Supreme Court's role is to establish only the minimal level, the lowest common
denominator, of individual rights applicable throughout the nation, while it is the role of state
courts, in discharging their additional responsibility to uphold their own constitutions, to
safeguard and supplement those rights where necessary. Sound policy considerations have
therefore been cited as the basis for different interpretations of common provisions-such
considerations as statutes or common law, traditions of the state, and distinctive public attitudes toward the scope, definition and protection of the right in question.
Id.; see Brennan, supra note 8, at 549; Devine, supra note 90, at 310-11; Williams, supra note 101,
at 389.
140. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis acknowledged:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. . . . But
in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles.
Id. (footnote omitted); see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
Here the Court stated:
In an age in which empirical study is increasingly relied upon as a foundation for decisionmaking, one of the more obvious merits of our federal system is the opportunity it affords
each State, if its people so choose, to become a "laboratory" and to experiment with a range
of trial and procedural alternatives. Although the need for the innovations that grow out of
diversity has always been great, imagination unimpeded by unwarranted demands for national uniformity is of special importance at a time when serious doubt exists as to the adequacy of our criminal justice system. The same diversity of local legislative responsiveness
that marked the development of economic and social reforms in this country, if not barred by
an unduly restrictive application of the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, might well lead to valuable
innovations with respect to determining-fairly and more expeditiously-the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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States Supreme Court, state courts need not be concerned with considerations of federalism." State supreme courts are familiar with the
unique traditions and conditions within their states and can interpret
and apply their state constitutions accordingly, rather than comporting
with the conditions that prevail in the nation generally. 142 State consti1 43
tutions also are more easily amended than the federal constitution,
and have been amended in capital punishment and other cases in response to specific unpopular state court decisions.14 4 For better or
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1141-44; Utter, supra note 96, at
1043-44; Utter & Pitler, supra note 83, at 643; Williams, supra note 101, at 398-99.
141. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987). The Court reiterated an earlier
opinion:
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in
terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social
utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that
the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not
unconstitutionally severe.
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 167, 524 A.2d 188, 209 (1987) (contending that application of state constitutional analysis to capital punishment issues "is particularly appropriate in view of the
'[c]onsiderations of federalism' that have constrained the United States Supreme Court in this
area") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (plurality opinion)); P.J.Video, Inc., 68
N.Y.2d at 307, 501 N.E.2d at 563, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15; Galie, supra note 73, at 105; Galie,
supra note 101, at 788-91; Kaye, supra note 108, at 308; Utter, supra note 96, at 1042-43.
142. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. State supreme courts also operate under
different institutional constraints than the United States Supreme Court, and often are said to
occupy a different role in the structure of state government. Justice Brennan observed:
The institutional position of the national Supreme Court may cause it to "underenforce" constitutional rules. The national court must remain highly sensitive to concerns of state and
local autonomy, obviously less of a problem for state courts, which are local, accountable
decisionmakers. It must further be remembered that the Federal Bill was enacted to place
limits on the federal government while state bills are widely perceived as granting affirmative
rights to citizens.
Brennan, supra note 8, at 549; see also Galie, supra note 73, at 104-05; Galie, supra note 101, at
787; Linde, supra note 85, at 188-89; Maltz, supra note 98, at 1016-21; Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Shapiro,
supra note 87, at 644-46; Williams, supra note 101, at 389-96.
143. Since 1775 the states have written and ratified approximately 146 constitutions. Only 20
states are governed by their original constitutions. The present constitutions of the 50 states have
been amended collectively in excess of 5300 times. From 1984 to 1985 approximately 238 proposed
state constitutional amendments were submitted to voters in 45 states. Kincaid, supra note 7, at
13-14. Louisiana leads the states in the number of constitutions adopted with 11. Massachusetts
has the oldest state constitution, dating back to 1780, but it has been amended 116 times. Friedman, supra note 74, at 35. There is no doubt that state constitutions are not perceived as being as
stable and relatively immutable as the federal constitution or that voters are hesitant to amend
them. This practice has been dubbed "amendomania." See Wilkes, supra note 78; Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. Rav. 279 (1949). In the 1970s state constitutions
were amended approximately 976 times. Galie, supra note 73, at 108. See generally Developments
in the Law, supra note 88, at 1353-54.
144. In November 1972 California voters approved an amendment to the state constitution
that restored capital punishment after the California Supreme Court had ruled the death penalty
violative of the state constitution in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr.
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worse, rulings premised on state constitutional grounds are not as insulated from majoritarian review and are not imbued with the same air of
Supreme Court decisions that rest upon
permanency as United 1States
45
the federal constitution.

State supreme courts are not bound by the death penalty jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, and for a number of doctrinal, empirical, and institutional reasons, they may choose to embrace
neither the rationale nor the results of Supreme Court decisions. What
they decide to do may depend upon the legal and factual groundwork
that is laid in preparation for state constitutional litigation. 14 6 A review
follows of state constitutional challenges that have been made against
different aspects of the death penalty. It is presented in part to describe
152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). See CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 27; supra note 118; see also People
v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 173-75, 599 P.2d 587, 605-06, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 299-300 (1979), appeal
after remand, 39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396, 218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985). Similarly the Massachusetts
electorate approved an amendment to the state constitution in November 1982 which affirmed that
the death penalty was not violative of the state constitution shortly after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared to the contrary in District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411
N.E.2d 1274 (1980). See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26; Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150,
152, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117-18 (1984); see also supra note 118. See generally Jensen v. Southern Pac.
Ry., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1914); Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1154-55; Fischer, Ballot
Propositions:The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State ConstitutionalJurisprudence,11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 43 (1983); Galie, supra note 73, at 108-10; Williams, supra note 101, at 382
(asserting that "[a] mendments to state constitutions overruling judicial interpretations are nothing
new"). In fact, "[o]ne of the most famous is the New York constitutional amendment overruling,
almost immediately, the New York Court of Appeals' 1911 decision declaring workmen's compensation unconstitutional." Id.(citing Ives v. Southern Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911)).
145. See Abrahamson, supra note 8, at 1155; Brennan, supra note 8, at 551. Justice Brennan
contends:
state court judges are often more immediately "subject to majoritarian pressures than federal
courts, and are correspondingly less independent than their federal counterparts." Federal
judges are guaranteed a salary and lifetime tenure; in contrast, state judges often are elected,
or, at the least, must succeed in retention elections. The relatively greater degree of political
accountability of state courts militates in favor of continued absolute deference to their interpretations of their own constitutions. Moreover, state constitutions are relatively easy to
amend; in many states the process is open to citizen initiative.
Id. (quoting Note, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive Federal Appellate Review over State Cases
Containing Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1081, 1096-97 (1984) (footnote omitted)); see also Fischer, supra note 144; Developments in the Law, supra note 88, at 1351-52. In
November 1986 California voters refused to return Chief Justice Bird and two of her colleagues to
the California Supreme Court in a judicial retention election, an outcome largely attributable to
their voting record in death penalty cases and their perceived leniency in criminal cases generally.
Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the
Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDIcATURE 348 (1987). Through May 1986 the California Supreme Court had vacated death sentences in all but 3 of the 56 capital cases it had decided, and no
one on death row had been executed. Chief Justice Bird, in fact, had voted to overturn either the
sentence or the conviction in every capital case decided by the court during her tenure. Culver &
Wold, supra note 39, at 86. In April 1985, a poll reflected that approximately 83% of California
voters reported that they favored the death penalty. Wold & Culver, supra, at 354.
146. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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what has been decided and in part to suggest what might still lie ahead.
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A.

Per Se Challenges

State supreme courts in California 147 and Massachusetts148 have declared the death penalty per se invalid on state constitutional grounds.
Voters in each state responded by swiftly approving constitutional
amendments that negated these rulings, and affirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment. 4 9 While judges on other state supreme
courts have opined that the death penalty is per se violative of their
state constitutions, 50 no other state tribunals have come to such a
15
conclusion.

1

147. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 628, 493 P.2d at 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
148. Watson, 381 Mass. at 648, 411 N.E.2d at 1274.
149. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27; MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26; see supra notes 118, 144.
150. Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 64, 74-96, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431-42 (1971) (DeBruler, J., dissenting), rev'd in part on reh'g and death penalty vacated, 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757 (1972); State
v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132-42 (Tenn.) (Brock, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933
(1981); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1357-59 (Utah 1977) (Maughn, J., dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978); State v. Rupe, 101 Wash. 2d 664, 711-13, 683 P.2d 571, 598-99 (1984)
(Dolliver, J., concurring), appeal after remand, 108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2834 (1988); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 199-216 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
151. Many state supreme courts have rejected the contention that capital punishment is per
se unconstitutional under their state constitutions. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 460 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1976), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 479 (1977), denial of petition for writ of error coram nobis
afl'd, 367 So. 2d 524 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), writ. denied, 367 So. 2d 534 (Ala.), denial of motion
for prelim. injunc. aff'd sub nom. Harris v. Wilters, 596 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Gillies,
135 Ariz. 500, 507-08, 662 P.2d 1007, 1014-15 (1983), appeal after remand, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d
655 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); Graham v. State, 253 Ark. 462, 463, 486 S.W.2d 678,
679 (1972), appeal after remand, 254 Ark. 741, 495 S.W.2d 864 (1973); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.
3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979), appeal after remand, 39 Cal. 3d 803, 705 P.2d 396,
218 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1985); State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761, 767-78 (Del. 1972); Raulerson v. State,
358 So. 2d 826, 828-29 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 840,
279 S.E.2d 650, 673 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); Lowery v. State, 478 N.E.2d 1214,
1219-20 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d 889, 894, 900
(Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Ky.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 860 (1984); State v. Edwards, 419 So. 2d 881, 889 (La. 1982); Colvin v. State,
299 Md. 88, 124-26, 472 A.2d 953, 971-72, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 158 n.10, 470 N.E.2d 116, 121 n.10 (1984); State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d
527, 539 (Mo.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 309 (1987); State v. Anderson, 207 Neb. 51, 71-72, 296
N.W.2d 440, 453 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265, 269-71,
578 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66
(1987); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 168-82, 524 A.2d 188, 210-16 (1987); State v. Garcia, 99
N.M. 771, 777, 664 P.2d 969, 975, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983); State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.
3d 164, 167-79, 473 N.E.2d 264, 272-81 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Glidewell v.
State, 663 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 136-39, 752 P.2d
1136, 1150-52 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 76, 454 A.2d 937, 968-69 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983); State v.
McDowell, 266 S.C. 508, 516, 224 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1976); State v. Austin, 618 S.W.2d 738, 741
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Different arguments can be used to urge state courts to rule that
capital punishment is per se violative of state constitutional provisions.
These include suggesting variations of the analysis adopted by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,1 52 which declined to conclude that the death penalty per se constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment. 153 One possibility is to accept Gregg's "evolving standards of decency" framework and argue that
the measures reflecting these standards within a given state compel
capital punishment to be declared unconstitutional. The courts and individual judges that have voted to invalidate the death penalty on state
constitutional grounds have emphasized, for example, the infrequency
of executions in their states'" or the infrequent imposition of death
sentences in state homicide cases 55 as evidence that the citizens of
their jurisdictions have rejected the capital sanction.156
A second variation using Gregg's basic framework requires incorpo(Tenn.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 409 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984); Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 320, 356 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 207 (1987); State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 31-35, 691 P.2d 929, 946-48 (1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1094 (1985); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 63-64 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908
(1983), appeal after remand, 679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1984), denial of sentence modification aff'd, 704
P.2d 1323 (Wyo. 1988).
With few exceptions, state supreme courts' conclusions that the death penalty is not per se
violative of state constitutional provisions are by simple fiat, reliance upon precedent which ultimately is by fiat, or are supported by a simple citation to federal precedent. But see Ramseur, 106
N.J. at 123, 524 A.2d at 188; Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 1, 691 P.2d at 929; Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at
43. They tend to be almost exclusively without reasoned analysis or consideration of specific state
historical factors, public attitudes, or analogous information. While these decisions may have some
precedential value, they should not be unimpeachable in the face of a comprehensive, well-reasoned state constitutional challenge to capital punishment.
152. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality decision).
153. It should be recalled that several state constitutions have provisions that are textually
dissimilar to the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause, one possible point of
departure from federal precedent. See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
154. See Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 654, 493 P.2d at 898, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 170; Adams, 259 Ind.
at 87-88, 271 N.E.2d at 437-38 (DeBruler, J., dissenting in part); Watson, 381 Mass. at 662, 411
N.E.2d at 1282; O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 275, 339 N.E.2d at 694 (Hennessey, J., concurring); Ramseur,
106 N.J. at 371-73, 524 A.2d at 315-16 (Handler, J., dissenting); Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 135-36
(Brock, C.J., dissenting); Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 208-09 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
155. See Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 654, 493 P.2d at 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 169; Adams, 259 Ind.
at 88, 271 N.E.2d at 438 (DeBruler, J., dissenting in part); O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 253-56, 339 N.E.2d
at 682-84; Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 373, 524 A.2d at 316 (Handler, J., dissenting).
156. Other facts pertinent to the administration of capital punishment within a state also
may be relevant. It might be offered, for example, that there is no evidence that the death penalty
deters the commission of criminal homicide within a state. See supra note 134. For at least one
state there even is evidence that executions may inspire killings. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note
133. It further may be relevant to suggest that states have risked executing or actually have executed innocent persons. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). See generally id. at 91-171 (cataloguing the defendants wrongfully convicted, sentenced, or executed in potentially capital cases).
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rating different assumptions within the decision's premises and pressing
for the conclusions that logically follow. If public attitudes and opinions
are relevant to conclusions about society's contemporary acceptance or
rejection of the death penalty, 157 the determination of precisely how
such attitudes are measured15 and whether they are to be taken at face
value is quite significant. Justice Marshall refuses to place much stock
in public attitudes about capital punishment on the assumption that
they do not reflect informed public opinion. 5 9 If this view is substantiated, and if it were further demonstrated that the predominant opinion
of an informed public would be condemnation of the death penalty, 60
157. Public attitudes figured prominently in the Court's rejecting the challenge to state
death penalty laws under the eighth amendment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality decision). See id. at 173, 179-82.
158. See, e.g., Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 647-49, 493 P.2d at 893-94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66.
The Anderson court contended:
[Plublic acceptance cannot be measured by the existence of death penalty statutes or by the
fact that some juries impose death on criminal defendants. Nor are public opinion polls about
a process which is far removed from the experience of those responding helpful in determining whether capital punishment would be acceptable to an informed public were it evenhandedly applied to a substantial proportion of the persons potentially subject to execution.
Although death penalty statutes do remain on the books of many jurisdictions, and public
opinion polls show opinion to be divided as to capital punishment as an abstract proposition,
the infrequency of its actual application suggests that among those persons called upon to
actually impose or carry out the death penalty it is being repudiated with ever increasing
frequency....
What our society does in actuality belies what it says with regard to its acceptance of
capital punishment.
Id. (emphasis added); see Watson, 381 Mass. at 662, 411 N.E.2d at 1282 (stating that "we think
that what our society does in actuality is a much more compelling indicator of the acceptability of
the death penalty than the responses citizens may give upon questioning"); id. at 1289-91 (Liacos,
J., concurring); Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 207-08 (Rose, C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 154,
155 and accompanying text. See generally Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 2, at 15-19.
159. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-69 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Marshall suggested that "the question with which we must deal is not whether
a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment
is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information presently available." Id. at 362. He remarked that "[ilt has often been noted that American citizens
know almost nothing about capital punishment." Id. He then noted a host of factors about the
death penalty, such as that it is not a more effective deterrent to murder than imprisonment, that
it is applied in an invidiously discriminatory fashion, that it has been inflicted against innocent
persons, that it is more expensive to administer than the alternative of life imprisonment, that
convicted murderers often are model prisoners and parolees, and so forth. Id. at 362-69. Justice
Marshall concluded: "Assuming knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital
punishment, the average citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense
of justice. For this reason alone capital punishment cannot stand." Id. at 369 (footnote omitted).
160. The so-called "Marshall hypothesis" has been tested with varying degrees of support
reported. See Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment:
Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 171; Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, Informed Public
Opinion and Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 43 (1981). See generally AMNESTY
INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY

174-77 (1987); Ellsworth & Ross, Public

Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Reten-
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Gregg's own premises logically would dictate quite a different conclusion about the constitutionality-of capital punishment.
Another possibility is to argue that the Court overlooked relevant
components of "cruelty" in Gregg and left its constitutional analysis
incomplete. The condemned's stay on death row, for instance, and the
psychological impact of lengthy waits for execution1 6 ' have been cited
by some courts as unacceptably cruel under state constitutions. 162 The
Gregg Court did not consider this aspect of capital punishment in its
interpretation of the eighth amendment, although not all state courts
may choose to ignore it.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman has been approved of
and relied upon in some state court opinions that have rejected capital
punishment on state constitutional grounds.' 6" It serves as an exemplary alternative model for assessing whether the death penalty is a
cruel and unusual punishment and makes use of four interrelated arguments. First, capital punishment is an unusually severe sanction because of its finality and the pain it causes. It reduces human beings to
objects and treats them inconsistently with the "primary principle...
that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.' 64 Second, strong evidence exists to show that
the death penalty is inflicted irregularly, arbitrarily, and unfairly, which
is of special concern in light of its severity.'6 5 Third, despite its theoretical availability, capital punishment is rarely used. This relative scarcity
of executions suggests that society has effectively rejected death as an
acceptable punishment. 6 Fourth and finally, the death penalty is an
excessive punishment that is inflicted unnecessarily. Imprisonment, a
the legitisignificantly less severe sanction, adequately accomplishes
6
mate penological objectives of capital punishment. 1
tionists, 29 CRIME& DELINQ. 116 (1983); Tyler & Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 21 (1982).
161. See generally R. JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIm LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981);

Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J.
PSYCHOLOGY 393 (1962); Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND
DEATH

155-56 (1960); Gallenore & Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confine-

ment, 129 AM. J.

PSYCHIATRY

167 (1972).

162. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 649-50, 493 P.2d at 894-95, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67; Watson, 381
Mass. at 663-65, 411 N.E.2d at 1282-83; id. at 1287 (Braucher, J., concurring); id. at 1289-95
(Liacos, J., concurring); O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 249-50, 339 N.E.2d at 680-81 (Tauro, C.J., concurring); Adams, 259 Ind. at 93, 271 N.E.2d at 440-41 (DeBruler, J., dissenting in part); Dicks, 615
S.W.2d at 136-37 (Brock, C.J., dissenting); Hopkinson, 632 P.2d at 209-10 (Rose, C.J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., Watson, 381 Mass. at 660-65, 411 N.E.2d at 1281-83; Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 13640 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
164. Furman, 408 U.S. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 270-74.
165. Id. at 274-77.
166. Id. at 277-79.
167. Id. at 279-81.
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In combination, these four attributes of the death penalty led Justice Brennan to conclude that it is a cruel and unusual punishment and
per se violative of the eighth amendment. Brennan wrote:
The test ..
will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is unusually
severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it
serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then
the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the [cruel and
unusual punishments] [c]lause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.168

This analysis, which Justice Brennan rather tiredly incorporated by
reference in his brief dissent in Gregg,169 is one step removed from even
more fundamental rejections of Gregg's "evolving standards of decency"
framework. Other judges have forsaken cruel and unusual punishment
principles altogether. They instead contend that the death penalty denies the fundamental right of life, and does so absent a demonstration
that it is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest or that the
state's interests cannot be achieved through less drastic and intrusive
means. 170 This argument is based upon substantive due process grounds
and persuaded a plurality of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
17
in Commonwealth v. O'Neal. '
168. Id. at 282. He stressed that these principles are "interrelated," id., and that none should
be expected in pure form in any civilized state, id. at 281-82. Rather, it is "the application of the
principles in combination," and in the degree to which they are exhibited that is determinative. Id.
at 282.
169. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 228-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also dissented in
Gregg, see id. at 231, and concurred in the judgment in Furman on the ground that the death
penalty is under all circumstances a cruel and unusual punishment. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 314
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Since the time of their opinions in Furman Justices
Brennan and Marshall have each consistently maintained that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
170. Commentators who have made this argument include Devine, supra note 90, at 388-93;
Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death:Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1030-57 (1978); Smith, The Death Penalty as an Unconstitutional
Deprivationof Life and the Right to Privacy, 25 B.C.L. R.v. 743 (1984).
171. 369 Mass. 242, 339 N.E.2d 676 (1975) (per curiam); see id. at 244-45, 339 N.E.2d at 677
(Tauro, C.J., concurring); id. at 274, 339 N.E.2d at 693 (Hennessey, J., concurring). The O'Neal
Court declared Massachusetts legislation unconstitutional which had provided for a mandatory
death penalty upon conviction for murder committed during a rape or attempted rape. At least
one other state supreme court judge has accepted the argument that death penalty legislation
serves no compelling interest that cannot be achieved through less intrusive means, and that application of capital punishment thus violates substantive due process rights. See State v. Pierre, 572
P.2d 1338, 1357-59 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). Other state courts have rejected state constitutional challenges to
capital punishment on substantive due process grounds. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 17677, 524 A.2d 188, 213 n.12 (1987) (rejecting a challenge under N.J. CONsT. art. I, para. 1, which
provides: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying life and liberty ... and of pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness"); Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1006 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 108
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The Gregg plurality implicitly rejected one of the principal premises of the substantive due process approach when Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and Justice Stevens agreed that the Court "cannot
'invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties
adequate to serve the ends of penology.' ,1172 Capital punishment is
nearly impossible to justify on grounds that it is necessary to accomplish legitimate penological objectives that cannot be served by life imprisonment. The strongest argument to the contrary can be made on
retributive grounds. 173 The empirical evidence concerning whether the
death penalty is a superior deterrent to incarceration is sufficiently dubious 74 and the argument that capital punishment is necessary to incapacitate offenders sufficiently weak1 75 to make it unlikely that a state
could affirmatively justify the death penalty on either ground.
If a state court cannot be convinced to consider a substantive due
process challenge to capital punishment, it may be willing to apply
other guarantees within the state constitution. As we have already
pointed out, a few state constitutions have provisions in addition to
"cruel and unusual punishments" clauses that limit or regulate the
states' authority to punish. These include clauses that prohibit "vindictive justice,' 7 and that promote premising state penal codes upon
principles of reformation or restoration. 77 In addition, many affirmaS. Ct. 35 (1987); Glidewell v. State, 663 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Burrows v. State,
640 P.2d 533, 545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); State v. Jenkins, 15
Ohio St. 3d 164, 167-68, 473 N.E.2d 264, 272-73 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Pierre,
572 P.2d at 1346.
172. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)). The plurality instead exhibited deference to the legislative choice of punishments,
indicating that the Constitution required only that "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering." Id. at 183.
173. See generally W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:. CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 153-76 (1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 2835, 43-45 (1983); van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662,
1667-69 (1986); van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Legal-Practical-Moral Analysis, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1978).
174. See supra note 134; see also Archer, Gartner & Beittel, Homicide and the Death Penalty: A Cross-NationalTest of a Deterrence Hypothesis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 991 (1983);
Forst, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence?, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
927 (1983); Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New Look in an Old Light, 29
CRIME & DELINQ. 88 (1983).
175. See Acker, Mandatory Capital Punishment for the Life Term Inmate Who Commits
Murder: Judgments of Fact and Value in Law and Social Science, 11 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINMENT 267, 301-04 (1985); Marquart & Sorensen, Institutionaland PostreleaseBehavior of
Furman-CommutedInmates in Texas, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1988); Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect
of the Death Penalty upon PrisonMurder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 159 (H. Bedau 3d
ed. 1982); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 472 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "incapacitation alone could not justify the imposition of capital punishment").
176. See supra notes 120, 121, and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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tively declare 17 8 life to be an "inalienable," "natural," or "inherent"
right. 179 Challenges to the death penalty under such provisions have not
been successful,' which perhaps is not surprising given their level of
generality. It may be urged, however, that in combination with other
more specific guarantees such declarations help establish the fundamental respect that human life is owed within a jurisdiction. They suggest the corresponding measure of the state's interest that must be
demonstrated if the deliberate taking of life is to be sanctioned as a
legitimate use of governmental power.' 8'
B.

"As Applied" Challenges and Discrimination
The prevailing Justices in Furman assumed that capital punishment was being administered unevenly. In Gregg the majority assumed
that statutory reforms were adequate to correct the assumed irregularities. Both Courts made decisions in the relative absence of reliable
data.'82 In McCleskey the majority assumed the statistical validity 83 of
178. The federal constitution's Bill of Rights consists primarily of prohibitions and restraints
against governmental action. One distinguishing characteristic of state constitutions is that they
often affirmatively guarantee individual rights instead of simply limiting the power of government.
See Galie, supra note 73, at 105; Maltz, supra note 98, at 1012-13; Williams, supra note 101, at
401.
179. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art 1, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 1; Ky.
CONST. art. 1, § 1; MONT. CONsT. art II, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; N.J. CONsT. art. 1, para. 1; N.M.
CONsT. art. II, § 4; OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1; UTAH
CONsT. art. I, § 1; VA. CONsT. art. I, § 1. Other state constitutions have provisions prohibiting
sanguinary laws. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. 1, § 9; MD. CONST. art. 16 (Declaration of Rights); N.H.
CONST. pt. I, art. 18. South Carolina's constitution provides, "nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor
unusual punishment be inflicted. .. ." S.C. COhST. art. I, § 15 (emphasis added). The South Carolina Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the death penalty is a form of corporal punishment prohibited by this provision. See State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 132, 284 S.E.2d 221, 224
(1981), appeal after remand, 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984); State
v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 186-87, 222 S.E.2d 287, 292 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 432 U.S. 902
(1977).
180. See Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980);
State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 (Mo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 884 (1982); Ramseur, 106
N.J. at 174-82, 524 A.2d at 213-16; State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 135-36, 489 N.E.2d 795, 806
(1986).
181. See Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 369-71, 524 A.2d at 314-15 (Handler, J., dissenting); State v.
Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 195-97, 752 P.2d 1136, 1185-86 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting), vacated on
other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989).
182. In FurmanJustice Douglas asserted that the death penalty was being applied arbitrarily
and discriminatorily, citing some supporting data. 408 U.S. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Brennan also maintained that capital punishment was applied arbitrarily,
inferring as much from the infrequency of its use. Id. at 274-77, 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Stewart argued that the death penalty was applied rarely and capriciously
and was a cruel and unusual punishment "in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). He provided no supporting evidence, however.
Justice White criticized the extreme infrequency and uneven application of the death penalty,
conceding:
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systematic research results that suggested racial discrimination had infected the administration of Georgia's death penalty, yet concluded
that such evidence did not establish a violation of the federal constitution.184 Gregg and McCleskey have effectively insulated most postFurman capital punishment statutes from federal review against claims
that, although facially constitutional, the statutes have been or risk being applied in an arbitrary, capricious, or invidiously discriminatory
manner.18 5 In principle, such claims remain viable under most state
constitutions.
State courts may remain receptive to "as applied" challenges to
death penalty legislation on state constitutional grounds for at least two
reasons. The first is dissatisfaction with the conceptual framework of
federal precedent which spawns lingering suspicions that Gregg and its
progeny have sanctioned capital punishment systems which have
Nor can I "prove" my conclusion from these data. . . . I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds
and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty.
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall maintained that the death penalty was applied
discriminatorily against blacks and men, citing supporting studies. Id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally White, The Role of Social Sciences in Determining the Constitutionality
of Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce

eds. 1976). In Gregg the plurality upheld the facial constitutionality of Georgia's revised capital
punishment procedures on the assumption that they rectified the potential for arbitrary administration that had been of concern to the Furman Court. See Furman,428 U.S. at 198-207; see also
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality decision); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(plurality decision). No data were available to test this assumption. In a concurring opinion Justice
White also rejected the contention that the revised capital punishment procedures did not correct
the infirmities perceived in Furman. He addressed one aspect of this claim specifically:
Petitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding
which cases to try as capital felonies is unsupported by any facts. Petitioner simply asserts
that since prosecutors have the power not to charge capital felonies they will exercise that
power in a standardless fashion. This is untenable. Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be
assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than
the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it
convicts.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
183. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987). Referring to the research evidence at
issue, Justice Powell noted for the majority, "we assume the study is valid statistically. . . . Our
assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the assumption that the
study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any sentencing decisions in Georgia." Id.
For a review of the study and the McCleskey decision, see Acker, supra note 61; Baldus & Cole,
supra note 61.
184. See supra notes 61, 62, and accompanying text.
185. "Arbitrariness" connotes a lack of conformity with legal criteria. One type of arbitrariness is "capriciousness," indicating a haphazard, unprincipled deviation from legal norms. "Discrimination" suggests a systematic and purposeful departure from legally permissible
considerations, such as reliance upon the race of the victim or the race of the defendant. See B.
NAKELL &

K.

HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY

16-17 (1987); Bowers & Pierce,

supra note 135, at 572-75; Gross & Maruo, supra note 135, at 35-36.
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merely "papered over"' 86 and not corrected the problems that plagued
the pre-Furman administration of the death penalty. The second is
that even if a state court finds the logic of Gregg and McCleskey persuasive, it may be sufficiently moved by the evidentiary predicate of an
"as applied" challenge to be convinced that a state constitutional violation has been established.
Furman v. Georgia has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
"mandate[] that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited
1' 87
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.'
Statutory schemes that incorporated standards to narrow and guide the
exercise of sentencing discretion were approved in Gregg and its companion cases. 8 Such schemes were expected to promote the functioning of capital sentencing systems "in a consistent and rational
manner."8 9 Two years after the post-Furman guided discretion
schemes were upheld, Lockett v. Ohio90 made clear that another imperative must be met if capital punishment legislation was to withstand
scrutiny under the federal constitution. "[T]he [e]ighth and
[f]ourteenth [a]mendments require that the sentencer.

. .

not be pre-

cluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."''
Lockett and subsequent decisions affirm that individualization of
sentences "is essential in capital cases.'

92

Gregg and Lockett, respectively, require consistency or reliability
in capital sentencing schemes and individualized sentencing that responds to the unique characteristics and circumstances of capital offenders and offenses. The cases pull in different directions. In theory
the twin objectives of consistency and individualization are reconcila186.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing

mandatory capital punishment legislation).
187. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion); see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302; Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983).
188. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262.

189. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) (quoting
PROJECTS ON STANDARDS

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND

PROCEDURES

§

4.1(a), Commentary, p. 201 (Approved Draft 1968)).

190. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality decision).
191.

Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). The attached footnote provided the

sole limitation to this rule: "Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to
exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense." Id. at 604 n.12.
192. Id. at 605; see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1987); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8, (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1340

[Vol. 42:1299

ble. They can be reconciled if consistency takes precedence at the "definition" stage of capital proceedings when the class of offenders eligible
for the death penalty is defined. Individualization is effective at the "selection" stage when the handful among those eligible for death actually
are sentenced to die.1 93 In practice, however, these distinctions blur.
Justice O'Connor has acknowledged "the tension that has long existed between the two central principles of [the Court's] [e]ighth
[a]mendment jurisprudence,"'" 4 a modest concession compared to
others' views. Justice White charged in his dissent in Lockett that the
plurality had completed an "about-face since Furman,' 9 and that "requiring.

. .

that sentencing authorities be permitted to consider and in

their discretion to act upon any and all mitigating circumstances . ..
invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was
generally reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration."' 9 Justice Rehnquist was even less restrained in stating that:
If a defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be permitted to offer as evidence in the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which [the defendant]
wishes, .

.

. the new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or

freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it.
...[I]t will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it. 97

These, of course, are the sentiments of the moderate to conserva193. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv.1, 23-37 (1980). The Supreme Court
has adopted this basic distinction between the "definition" and "selection" stages of capital proceedings. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 305. The Court indicated:
[O]ur decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required threshold below which the death
penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that
narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the threshold .... Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration

of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this
respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any
relevant information offered by the defendant.
Id. at 305-06; see also Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79. In Zant the Court averred:
statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of
legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
....

What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the

basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.
Id. (emphasis in original).
194. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987). Justice O'Connor stated that discretion in
capital sentencing "must be 'controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce nondiscriminatory application.' On the other hand, this Court has also held that a sentencing body
must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's character or
background, and the circumstances of the particular offense." Id. at 544 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
195. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
196. Id. at 623.
197. Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tive wing of the Court. Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan, who
share the view that the death penalty is per se violative of the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause, 198 both have denounced the procedural legacy of Gregg and subsequent decisions. Justice Marshall has opined that "[tihe task of eliminating arbitrariness in
the infliction of capital punishment is proving to be one which our
criminal justice system-and perhaps any criminal justice system-is
unable to perform."199 In Justice Brennan's view, "the Court is simply
deluding itself, and also the American public, when it insists that those
defendants who have already been executed or are today condemned to
death have been selected on a basis that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, under any meaningful definition of those terms."200
Basic dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's procedural doctrine,
especially the manifest tension between the requirements of evenhandedness or reliability in capital sentencing on the one hand and individualization on the other, has led at least a few state supreme court
judges to conclude that the framework ought to be rejected as unworkable. 0 It also invites de novo analysis under state constitutions of the
198. See supra note 168.
199. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 440 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
continued:
The Georgia court's inability to administer its capital punishment statute in an evenhanded fashion is not necessarily attributable to any bad faith on its part; it is, I believe,
symptomatic of a deeper problem that is proving to be genuinely intractable. Just five years
before Gregg, Mr. Justice Harlan stated for the Court that the tasks of identifying "before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and [of] express[ing] these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be . . . beyond present human ability."
Id. at 441-42 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971)). His conclusion was that
"the enterprise on which the Court embarked in Gregg v. Georgia . . . increasingly appears to be
doomed to failure." Id. at 434.
200. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 60 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
201. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 367-69, 524 A.2d 188, 313-14 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting) (accusing federal death penalty doctrine of "fundamental incoherence"). Justice Handler
also argued:
The Supreme Court, unable to harness the contending forces of individualization and consistency, has allowed death penalty prosecutions to run out of control. It has sanctioned arbitrary sentencing, and sacrificed the principle underlying Furman and Gregg that death is
different in kind from other forms of punishment and thus demands heightened procedural
safeguards in sentencing. Instead of balancing individualization and consistency, it has permitted these indispensable principles to cancel out one another. . . . [W]hen the Court has
exalted individualization, it has crippled uniformity; when it has tried to rescue uniformity, it
has become incoherent. The result is "legal doctrine-making in a state of nervous breakdown," "almost a bare aesthetic exhortation that the state just do something-anything-to
give the death penalty a legal appearance.". . . The federal precedent sets a poor example of
constitutional jurisprudence and should not be considered as an interpretative model in giving meaning to our own Constitution or followed to set the outer limits of individual protec-
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procedures that ought to be required for the administration of the
death penalty. In a recent dissent from a New Jersey Supreme Court
decision upholding the state's capital punishment statute against challenges brought under both the federal and state constitutions, Justice
Handler declared: "Because I believe that the federal decisional law has
lost coherence and pursues fundamentally contradictory-perhaps unattainable-goals, I have no confidence in federal precedent as a guide
in interpreting [the New Jersey] Constitution."' 202 He proceeded to conclude that New Jersey's death penalty as applied violated implicit state
203
constitutional prohibitions against arbitrary capital decision making.
State courts that choose to adhere to the major tenets of federal
doctrine concerning "as applied" challenges to the death penalty may
not accept all of its aspects. Regulation of prosecutorial decision making
in capital cases may be of more concern to state courts than to the Supreme Court, for example. The Justices have all but exempted district
attorneys' charging and plea bargaining decisions from review and require only that the discretion exercised by capital sentencing authorities be subjected to legislative guidance and judicial review.
In Gregg the prospects that district attorneys would abuse their
charging and plea bargaining discretion were dismissed as speculative
and remote.20 4 In McCleskey statewide evidence offered in substantiation of these same claims was dismissed as irrelevant to an equal protection challenge 25 and insufficient to establish the claim that Georgia's
capital punishment statutes as applied violated the federal cruel and
tion in this [S]tate.
Id. at 368-69, 524 A.2d at 313-14 (citation omitted); see State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d
463, 470 (1983) (acknowledging that "an almost unavoidable conflict presents itself to a legislature
attempting to design a sentencing process that is both a consistent and principled system of punishment and one that is flexibly humane and cognizant of the uniqueness of each individual defendant"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 190, 524 A.2d at 221
(acknowledging that "the Supreme Court has faltered in its pursuit of consistency and reliability,"
but rejecting the contention that "the goals themselves are 'fundamentally contradictory-perhaps
unattainable' "); State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 133-34 (Tenn.) (Brock, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that "[i]n my opinion it is impossible to reconcile this tension between consistency (sought to be
achieved by guiding the jury's discretion) and individual justice (attempted by allowing the jury to
exercise discretion)"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981). See generally Devine, supra note 90, at
276-309.
202. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 347, 524 A.2d at 302 (Handeer, J., dissenting); see supra note 200.
203. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 369-71, 524 A.2d at 314-15 (applying the principles reflected in the
state constitution's provisions guaranteeing the right to life, protecting against discrimination, and
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments). Justice Handler declined to go so far as to conclude
that the death penalty was per se violative of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 382, 524 A.2d at
321.
204. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
205. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07. The majority concluded that the statewide data were
inadequate to raise the inference that purposeful discrimination had been a factor in any individual case. Id. at 298-99.
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unusual punishments clause." 6 Four dissenting Justices in McCleskey
pointed out that these conclusions are debatable on both doctrinal and
empirical grounds. 0
State courts should be urged to scrutinize
prosecutorial capital decision making closely under state constitutions.
Studies completed in several states have suggested that both the
race of victims 2 05 and the geographical location of crimes 0 9 may influence prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty. It has been postulated that white victim homicides, especially those committed by
blacks, are more likely to elicit the wrath of predominantly white com-

munities than homicides that victimize blacks.

10

Similarly, the resi-

dents of less populous, relatively homogeneous rural communities may
collectively experience and express more outrage 211 at killings within
206. Id. at 312-13. The Court stated:
Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to
assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize
racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system,
and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus
study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.
Id. at 313.
207. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented from the Court's opinion.
See id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 366 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See generally Acker, supra note 61, at 468-80. Note that Justice Stevens was among
the Gregg plurality and Justice Blackmun concurred in Gregg on the issue of the facial constitutionality of Georgia's capital punishment legislation. Each was persuaded in McCleskey, however,
that the manner in which the statute had been applied violated the federal constitution.
208. See, e.g., Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709-10 (1983);

Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital
Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1071-74 (1983); Bowers & Pierce, supra note 135, at

607-16; Gross & Mauro, supra note 135, at 54-92; Paternoster, ProsecutorDiscretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination,18 LAW & Soc'y REv. 437
(1984); Paternoster & Jacoby, Sentencing Discretionand Jury Packing: FurtherChallenges to the
Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982); Radelet, supra note 135, at 922-26;

Radelet & Pierce, supra note 135, at 591-92; Zeisel, supra note 135.
209. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 208, at 1072-75; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 135, at 60107, 616-19; Gross & Mauro, supra note 135, at 64-66; Paternoster, supra note 135.
210. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 361 n.13 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) Justice
Blackmun counselled:

[T]here are many ways in which racial factors can enter indirectly into prosecutorial decisions. For example, the authors of a study similar to that of Baldus explained: "Since death
penalty prosecutions require large allocations of scarce prosecutorial resources, prosecutors
must choose a small number of cases to receive this expensive treatment. In making these
choices they may favor homicides that are visible and disturbing to the majority of the community, and these will tend to be white-victim homicides."
Id. (quoting Gross & Mauro, supra note 135, at 106-07); see Bowers & Pierce, supra note 134, at
467-78. See generally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
211. See generally W. BERNS, supra note 173, at 153-76 (discussing the "morality of anger"
in the context of capital punishment).
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their borders than the inhabitants of larger, more anonymous urban
communities. 12 District attorneys are elected officials in most jurisdictions and may respond either consciously or subconsciously to perceived
community sentiments when making charging decisions. 13 Capital
prosecutions may be commenced only sparingly because of their unusual expense and consumption of time, making it particularly important that prosecutors get the maximum "return" on the homicide cases
in which they seek the death penalty.21 '
While a majority of the Supreme Court has turned a blind eye to
these problems, state courts may not if presented with the proper supporting evidence. Some state court judges have joined the McCleskey
dissenters in decrying the absence of guidelines to help regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases.

215

For the most part,

however, state constitutional challenges on related grounds have proceeded without solid empirical foundation.1 6 This absence has allowed
212. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 135, at 632; Paternoster, supra note 135.
213. See Bowers, supra note 208, at 1069; see also supra note 210 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 210; see also State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 214-15, 752 P.2d 1136, 1197
n.7 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting). Justice Linde reasoned:
In our decentralized system of criminal justice, a particular prosecutor's decision to seek
the death penalty may be unequally affected by its extraordinary costs in addition to plea
bargaining considerations such as a defendant's willingness to plead guilty or to testify
against accomplices, even intangibles like the relationship of the victim or the defendant to
the community, not to mention turnover in the offices of prosecutor and of governor.
Id. See generally N.Y. STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, CAPITAL LOSSEs: THE PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY

FOR NEW YORK STATE (1982); Gross & Mauro, supra note 135, at 106-07; Nakell, The Cost of the
Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 69 (1978); Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and
Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1221 (1985).
215. See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 258, 548 A.2d 939, 955-56 (1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 813 (1989); id. at 372-79, 548 A.2d at 1016-20 (Handler, J., dissenting in part); Ramseur, 106
N.J. at 404-06, 524 A.2d at 332-33 (Handler, J., dissenting); Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 140 (Brock, C.J.,
dissenting); State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 41-50, 691 P.2d 929, 953-56 (1984) (Utter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985). These state judges have
been joined by the four dissenters in McCleskey, all of whom authored or joined opinions calling
for greater strictures to be placed on prosecutors' capital charging decisions. See McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216. See State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 160, 692 P.2d 991, 1009 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1111 (1985) (criticizing the adequacy of the data offered in support of a claim that the race of
the victim influenced capital sentencing, but not indicating, however, that the challenge was made
on state constitutional grounds); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 605, 468 A.2d 45, 64 (1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1987) (noting that absent evidence that prosecutors have exercised charging
discretion arbitrarily, defendant's state constitutional claim will be rejected); State v. Mallett, 732
S.W.2d 527, 538-39 (Mo.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 309 (1987). The Mallett Court stated: "Compared to the statistics introduced by the defendant in McCleskey, the statistics offered by the
defendant here are superficial. Therefore, given that the McCleskey statistics were insufficient to
establish an equal protection claim, the statistics offered here also are insufficient to establish such
a claim." Id. at 539; see also Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 192-93, 524 A.2d at 222 (expressing concern
about unregulated prosecutorial charging discretion in a capital case, but refusing to invalidate a
death sentence absent a showing of abuse of discretion); id. at 332, 524 A.2d at 295 (O'Hern, J.,
concurring in the result) (citing a lack of evidence, to date, that New Jersey's death penalty had
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state supreme courts the comparatively easy route of dismissing the
sufficiency of the data underlying these claims without seriously having
to confront whether McCleskey's reasoning should be rejected.2 17
Social science researchers and attorneys within the individual
states should engage in collaborative efforts to prepare and litigate
claims that death penalty statutes are being applied in violation of state
constitutional principles. Lawyers urging the doctrinal weaknesses of
McCleskey and related cases will present much more compelling cases
if empirical evidence substantiates that capital punishment in their

states '18 continues to be administered in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory fashion, notwithstanding legislative reforms that regulate
sentencing discretion. State supreme courts should be urged, and may
be convinced, to part ways with federal precedent on both doctrinal and

empirical grounds.
C.

Challenges to Capital Juries

Four states rely exclusively on judges to preside at the penalty
phase of capital trials and determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment for defendants convicted of capital murder. 210 Three additional states enlist juries only to render nonbinding, advisory opinions
about capital sentencing with trial judges retaining ultimate sentencing
been applied disproportionately); State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St. 3d 56, 64-66, 512 N.E.2d 585, 593-94
(1987) (citing the inadequacy of the defendant's data concerning the claim that the death penalty
is imposed disproportionately in white victim homicide convictions), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 786
(1988). The one state supreme court that has been sufficiently disturbed by the claim that capital
punishment has been administered in an arbitrary or racially discriminatory manner to use this as
a basis for invalidating the death penalty on state constitutional grounds has, in turn, been criticized for making indefensible use of the available data. See District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass.
648, 665-71, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283-86 (1980); see also Dorin, A Case Study of the Misuse of Social
Science in CapitalPunishment Cases: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's Finding of
Racial Discriminationin Watson, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 213 (K. Haas & J. Inciardi, eds. 1988).
217. See supra note 216; see also Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826, 828-29 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); People v. Guest, 115 IlM.2d 72, 108-09, 503 N.E.2d 255, 272 (1986),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987); Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1009-10 (Mont. 1981), appeal after remand, 206 Mont. 205, 684 P.2d 1112 (1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 643-44,
314 S.E.2d 493, 500-01 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985); State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d
164, 169-70, 473 N.E.2d 264, 273-74 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
218. The fact dependence of much of death penalty jurisprudence, and the need for litigants
to focus on intrastate rather than national data are discussed supra at notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
219. The states are Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. See Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13703(B) (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2520 (1985). Additionally, in Nevada a three judge panel is authorized to make capital
sentencing decisions when trial juries, which normally impose sentence, are unable to reach a
unanimous verdict on whether the death penalty or life imprisonment is in order. See NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 175.554, 175.556 (1985).

1346

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1299

authority 2 0 Most states have long required jury sentencing in capital
trials,22 ' a function which the Supreme Court once lauded as vital "to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system-a link without which the determination of punishment could
hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.' "222
Notwithstanding the historical and functionally significant involvement of juries in capital sentencing decisions, the Supreme Court has
upheld the states' authority to permit a single judge to impose a death
sentence over a jury's recommendation that the defendant be sentenced
to life imprisonment.2 23 In doing so it rejected federal constitutional
claims brought under double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment,
trial by jury, and due process grounds. 24 Similar arguments have been
made under state constitutions and rejected in nearly all of the states
authorizing judicial sentencing in capital trials. 2 5 Two members of the
220. Alabama, Florida, and Indiana use such a procedure. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(a),
13A-5-47(a), (e) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2), (3) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-29(e) (Burns 1985).
221. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 472 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gillers, supra
note 193, at 13-19.
222. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
223. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 447. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented in Spaziano. See id. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 457-58.
225. See Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351, 363-64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 485 So. 2d 373 (Ala.), on remand, 485 So.2d 378 (Ala.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909 (1986);
State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 159, 692 P.2d 991, 1008 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1011 (1985);
State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 697, 747 P.2d 710, 719 (1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2815 (1988);
Fitzpatrick v. State, 638 P.2d 1002, 1012 (Mont. 1981) (rejecting a claim for jury sentencing on
federal rather than state constitutional grounds), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980), appeal after
remand, 684 P.2d 1112 (Mont. 1984); State v. Anderson, 207 Neb. 51, 71-72, 296 N.W.2d 440, 453
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). A related claim succeeded in the Oregon Supreme
Court. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981). The death penalty was reinstated in
Oregon in 1978 by an initiative in the general election. Murder was defined as the "intentional"
killing of another by one not under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. See Quinn,
290 Or. at 401-02, 623 P.2d at 640-41; OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115 (1971). Before capital punishment
could be imposed for murder, the sentencing authority, then the judge, had to answer three questions in the affirmative, one of which was whether the defendant had acted "deliberately" and with
the reasonable expectation that death would ensue. See Quinn, 290 Or. at 403, 623 P.2d at 642; OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.116(2)(a) (1978). The Oregon Supreme Court ruled in Quinn that the "deliberation" finding required before a capital sentence could be imposed was functionally an element of
the crime, and that to allow the sentencing judge alone to make this finding denied the accused his
state constitutional right to trial by jury.
Because ORS 163.116 authorizes an enhanced penalty to be imposed based upon a determination by the court of the existence of the requisite culpable mental state with which the
crime was committed, a mental state different and greater than that found by the jury, imposition of a greater penalty under the statute denies to the defendant his right to trial by jury
embodied in Oregon Constitution Article I, section 11 of all the facts constituting the crime
for which he is in jeopardy.
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Idaho Supreme Court 22 " have registered the most spirited disagreement
with the prevailing view by consistently maintaining that the Idaho
Constitution requires jury sentencing in death penalty cases. They base
their argument on state historical events 227 and the respective capabilities of juries and judges to perform the unique duty of imposing capital
sentences.22 8
In the majority of death penalty states that rely upon jury sentencing, the principal issues to be explored under state constitutions relate
to the death qualification of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court
first spoke to the death qualification process in Witherspoon v. Illinois.229 The Justices recognized that states legitimately may exclude individuals with strong scruples against capital punishment from serving
on juries that make death penalty decisions23 0 but set forth stringent
standards governing their disqualification. Prospective jurors in capital
trials could be excluded only if they
made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automaticallyvote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defend23
ant's guilt. 1

The Witherspoon Court also rejected the defendant's contention
Quinn, 290 Or. at 407, 623 P.2d at 644. See generally Kanter, Brief Against Death: More on the
Constitutionalityof CapitalPunishment in Oregon, 17 WELLAMEBrr L. REV. 629, 629-31 (1981). In
response to Quinn Oregon's death penalty statute was amended to require jury sentencing, rather
than judicial sentencing. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1985); see also State v. Wagner, 305 Or.
115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989).
226. Lankford, 113 Idaho at 704, 747 P.2d at 726 (Huntley, J., concurring); id. at 718, 747
P.2d at 740 (Bristline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho
362, 375, 670 P.2d 463, 476 (1983) (Huntley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); id.
at 386, 670 P.2d at 487 (Bristline, J., dissenting); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 908, 674 P.2d 396,
404 (1983) (Bristline, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984); id. at 921, 674 P.2d at 417
(Huntley, J., dissenting).
227. See Creech, 105 Idaho at 376, 670 P.2d at 477 (Huntley, J., dissenting) (noting that jury
participation in capital sentencing was required by statute in 1890, and arguing that the constitution should be construed as having adopted this practice).
228. See id. at 383-86, 670 P.2d at 484-87 (Huntley, J., dissenting) (incorporating the defendant's brief, which provides an excellent exposition of the differences between jury sentencing and
judge sentencing, with supporting authorities).
229. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
230. Id. at 513-14. But see id. at 523-32 (opinion of Douglas, J.). Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas asserted:
[There is] no constitutional basis for excluding those who are so opposed to capital punishment that they would never inflict it on a defendant. Exclusion of them means the selection
of jurors who are either protagonists of the death penalty or neutral concerning it. That results in a systematic exclusion of qualified groups, and the deprivation to the accused of a
cross-section of the community for decision on both his guilt and his punishment.
Id. at 528.
231. Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
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that the death qualification process produced juries prone to convict. It
dismissed as "too tentative and fragmentary" 3 2 evidence suggesting
that death qualified juries were more likely than other juries to find the
accused guilty as charged. "In light of the presently available information, [the Justices were] not prepared to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction '2 33 produced by a
death qualified jury.
Since Witherspoon the Supreme Court has taken two steps backward in the area of death qualification, making this area an especially
important one for state constitutional decision making. In Wainwright
v. Witt 234 the Court took the step of making less rigorous the test for
the death qualification of jurors. The Court ruled that
the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for
cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's
views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties
2
as a juror in accordance with his [or her] instructions and his [or her] oath.

Perhaps more significantly, the Court replaced Witherspoon's mandate
that an individual's views about the death penalty be "unmistakably
clear"236 prior to the disqualification of that individual from jury service. Under Witt, a trial judge only need be "left with a definite impression"2 3' that the prospective juror is properly excludable. This
judgment is entitled to substantial deference when reviewed by a fed23 8
eral court.
232. Id. at 517.
233. Id. at 518.

234. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
235. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)) (elaborating that "inaddition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to 'automatic' decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity' ").
236. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968); see supra text accompanying note
231.
237. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426.
238. See id. at 426, 431-35. The Witt majority stated that "the question is not whether a
reviewing court might disagree with the trial court's findings, but whether those findings are fairly
supported by the record." Id. at 434. The Court continued:
The trial court's finding of bias was made under the proper standard, was subject to [28
U.S.C.] § 2254(d), and was fairly supported by the record. Since respondent has not adduced
"clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous," we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 435. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent:
The Court today establishes an entirely new standard significantly more lenient than that of
Witherspoon. The difference does not lie in the freedom of the [s]tate to depart from the
precise inquiry of Witherspoon's footnote 21 .... The crucial departure is the decision to

discard Witherspoon's stringent standards of proof. The Court no longer prohibits exclusion
of uncertain, vacillating, or ambiguous prospective jurors. It no longer requires an unmistakably clear showing that a prospective juror will be prevented or substantially impaired from
following instructions and abiding by an oath.
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The Court took its other significant step in Lockhart v. McCree 3 9
when it reconsidered the claim made in Witherspoon that the death
qualification of jurors denied the accused the right to a fair trial at the
guilt determination stage of a capital proceeding. The Lockhart majority found unpersuasive new evidence offered in support of the claim
that death qualified juries were conviction prone.240 It went beyond this
rejection to conclude as a matter of law that death qualified juries were
not less than "impartial" under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.2 41 Nor, the Court ruled, do persons whose views about the death

penalty disqualify them from service on a capital jury constitute a "distinctive group" 22 for purposes of the constitutional requirement that
criminal trial juries be selected from a fair cross-section of the community.214 This ruling sweepingly rejected a claim that, if successful, would

have required the states to alter substantially their capital jury selection procedures. 4
Id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
240. Id. at 168-73.
241. After disparaging the research evidence offered in support of McCree's claims, the Court
went on to "assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both methodologically valid
and adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries." Id. at 173. It concluded that death qualified juries
cannot be "impartial" in the sense contemplated by the federal constitution because "an impartial
jury consists of nothing more than 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the
facts.'" Id. at 178 (emphasis in original) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423). It further argued:
McCree admits that exactly the same 12 individuals could have ended up on his jury through
the "luck of the draw," without in any way violating the constitutional guarantee of impartiality. Even accepting McCree's position that we should focus on the jury rather than the individual jurors, it is hard for us to understand the logic of the argument that a given jury is
unconstitutionally partial when it results from a state-ordained process, yet impartial when
exactly the same jury results from mere chance.
Id. For Justice Marshall's response to the latter point, see id. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 174. The Court stated:
The essence of a "fair-cross-section" claim is the systematic exclusion of "a 'distinctive' group
in the community." In our view, groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would
prevent or substantially impair members of the group from performing one of their duties as
jurors, such as the "Witherspoon-excludables" at issue here, are not "distinctive groups" for
fair-cross-section purposes.
Id. (citation omitted).
243. For good measure the majority also concluded that the "fair-cross-section" requirement
implicit in the federal constitution applied only to the composition of the jury venire, and not to
the trial jury proper. See id. at 173-74.
244. Actually, states would be left with a number of alternatives that could be used to accommodate both the accused's interest in having a nondeath qualified jury determine guilt or innocence, and the state's interest in having jurors at the penalty phase who would abide by the law
and impose the death penalty under appropriate circumstances. These range from impanelling two
separate juries, one for guilt and one for punishment in the event of a capital conviction, to simply
impanelling an adequate number of alternate jurors to ensure that death qualified individuals
would be available for sentencing if a penalty trial were necessary. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226, 242-43 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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Issues of this type may be resolved differently under state constitutions if state courts can be convinced on either empirical or analytical
grounds that the death qualification process unnecessarily compromises
a capital defendant's right to an impartial jury, or a jury selected from a
representative cross-section of the community. If such concerns are
triggered at all, they may be heightened as Witt-like standards for
death qualification replace Witherspoon's more stringent requirements
and the size of the excluded class increases with the relaxation of the
test for exclusion. Dissenting judges on at least two state supreme
courts have interpreted their respective state constitutions to prohibit
the exclusion for cause of nondeath qualified jurors from the guilt determination stage of capital trials.2 5 More state judges may do so if
persuaded that the interplay of Witt and Lockhart cuts too deeply into
the jury rights of capital defendants under state constitutional
provisions.
Evidence presented at the trial stage of the cases that wound their
way to the Supreme Court and resulted in the Lockhart decision 41 led
the United States District Court to conclude that about fourteen percent of Arkansas' adult population would be excludable under Witherspoon from serving as jurors at the guilt phase of capital trials.4
These procedures would have to be implemented only in trials that resulted in capital convictions,
of course, and might even result in net administrative savings to the state, as the time and complexities of capital jury selection diminished accordingly. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 204-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries:The Biasing Effects
of the Death-QualificationProcess, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); Haney, Examining Death
Qualification:FurtherAnalysis of the ProcessEffect, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 133 (1984) (suggesting
that the questions posed during voir dire in the selection of death qualified jurors can predispose
potential jurors to assume that the accused is guilty of the charged offense, and that the principal
trial issue is whether the death penalty should be imposed).
245. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 429-34, 524 A.2d 188, 345-48 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting); see also id. at 295-300 (O'Hern, J., concurring) (relying not on the state constitution, but
on the supervisory powers of the New Jersey Supreme Court, to maintain that capital juries should
not be death qualified at the guilt determination stage of a trial); State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126,
139-41, 261 S.E.2d 803, 811-12 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting). State supreme courts considering this
claim have rejected it. See Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 248-54, 524 A.2d at 250-54 (1987); State v. Woods,
316 N.C. 344, 348, 341 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1986); Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 241-43 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 201 (1987).
246. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd as modified, 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Three
claimants joined the challenge to Arkansas' death qualification procedures: Grigsby, who died
while the litigation was pending, Hulsey, whose claim was forfeited because of a procedural error,
and McCree, whose claim eventually was resolved by the Supreme Court. See id. at 1276, 1277 n.2;
see also Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168 n.2. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegations, and its opinion includes an extensive summary of the evidence along with its findings.
247. See Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1294, 1308. This figure is the percentage whose views about
the death penalty would prevent service on a capital sentencing jury, but would not prevent impartiality at the guilt phase of a capital trial-i.e., "Witherspoon-excludables," who are "guilt-phase
includable," as opposed to "nullifiers." See id. at 1288-91. The court noted that available evidence
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Blacks in the state were much more likely than whites to fail Witherspoon's death qualification test, 248 and women were more likely than
men to be excludable. 249 The Supreme Court ignored the evidence spe-

cific to Arkansas in Lockhart and addressed social science findings that
dealt with death qualified juries generally.
Both the absolute size of the class of "Witherspoon excludables"
and the relative proportions of racial and gender groups who would not
be death qualified may vary from state to state. 250 The relevant data

should be collected for each jurisdiction in which a Lockhart-type chalsuggested that between 11% and 17% of the population in Arkansas and in the country as a whole
were excludable under Witherspoon from serving on a capital sentencing jury yet qualified to determine guilt or innocence at a capital trial. See id. at 1285.
248. Id. at 1294. A survey indicated that 45% of blacks and 10% of whites in Arkansas were
"strongly opposed" to the death penalty and that "even after excluding 'nullifiers' 29% of the
blacks would never impose the death penalty compared to 9% of the whites." Id.
249. Id. The survey indicated that 21% of the women in Arkansas were "strongly opposed"
to capital punishment, compared to 8% of the men, and that "whereas only 8% of Arkansas men
would be Witherspoon excludables (after removing 'nullifiers'), 13% of Arkansas women would fall
into that classification." Id.
250. In 1986, in response to the question, "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for
persons convicted of murder?", 71% of a sample representing the country as a whole reported that
they "favored" the death penalty, 23% "opposed" it, and 5% responded "don't know." Differences
were exhibited between racial groups, between men and women, and among different regions of the
country, as reported below:
TABLE 1: VIEws ON THE DEATH PENALTY

FAvOR

OPPOSE

Do NOT KNOW

75%
49%

20%
43%

5%
8%

79%
66%

17%
28%

4%
6%

70%
69%
67%
83%

26%
26%
26%
13%

4%
5%
7%
4%

RACE

Caucasian
Black/Other

SEX

Male
Female

REGION

Northeast
Midwest
South
West

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTIcs-1986 table 2.23, at 10001 (K. Jamieson & T. Flanagan eds., 1987). The intrastate variation in responses is no doubt
greater than the regional differences displayed. Of course, opinion poll responses correspond imperfectly to the death qualification of actual trial jurors. See generally supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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lenge is raised under the state constitution. Both the "impartiality" and
"representativeness"of death qualified juries may be affected by the
size and attributes of the excluded class2 51 provided state courts can be
persuaded to reject the crabbed interpretation given such concepts by
the majority opinion in Lockhart.252
This end may be accomplished if it can be demonstrated in any
state that the right to an impartial jury selected through procedures not
systematically excluding significant segments of the community is esteemed as particularly valuable, especially when human life is at stake.
By statute or constitution many states require that capital juries may
not be waived, or must be comprised of twelve members, and must return unanimous verdicts. Juries in noncapital trials in these same states
may be waivable, include only six members, or decide cases by
nonunanimous vote. 253 These distinctions may be evidence that certain
states are particularly solicitous of jury rights in capital trials and are
willing to require special procedures to protect them.
The irony is that death qualification itself is a "special procedure"
invoked only in capital trials. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in Lockhart, all the accused in a capital trial "asks is the chance to
have his guilt or innocence determined by a jury like those that sit in
noncapital cases .
",254 State courts may be less restrained than the
Supreme Court about requiring that the guilt phase of capital trials be
conducted before juries that have not been death qualified.2

55

This ten-

251. The class of persons properly excludable from capital jury service is no doubt larger
under Witt than under Witherspoon, and the Witherspoon standard has been used in most studies to date. See supra notes 229-38 and accompanying text; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 191-92 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Finch & Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to DeathQualified Juries: On FurtherExamination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 63 (1986).
252. See, e.g., W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 162-94 (1987); Bersoff, Social
Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 52
(1987).
253. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1985) (asserting that "[t]welve persons shall
constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other
criminal cases"); LA. CODE CalM. PROc. ANN. art. 782 (West 1981) (requiring unanimous, 12-person
jury verdict in capital cases; allowing for waiver of right to trial by jury in all but capital cases;
allowing verdicts at the concurrence of 10 of 12 jurors in cases requiring imprisonment; and allowing verdicts by unanimous, 6-person juries in criminal trials that may result in imprisonment);
OR. CONsT. art. I, § 11 (prohibiting a waiver of a jury trial in capital cases and allowing verdicts
upon the concurrence of 10 members of a jury in all criminal cases except upon first degree murder
charges, for which juries must return unanimous verdicts); OR. REv. STAT. § 136.450 (1987) (generally allowing criminal trial juries to return verdicts upon the concurrence of 10 of the 12 members).
See generally infra note 291.
254. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255. State courts have fewer concerns relating to federalism than does the Supreme Court, or
about inhibiting experimentation throughout the entire country as a result of constitutional adjudication. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. The Lockhart Court understandably was
sensitive to such concerns: "[W]e are 'unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a [s]tate
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dency would be especially likely if it is shown that the procedures necessary to implement such a requirement are not unduly burdensome," 6
or that the state's interests in the death qualification of jurors before
the sentencing stage of a capital trial appear to be insubstantial or
unsubstantiated.25 7
A final issue that may assume significance under state constitutions
concerns the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude purposefully individuals with strong scruples against the death penalty
from serving on capital juries. Death qualification under Witherspoon
and Witt involves challenges for cause. In Batson v. Kentucky 5 the
25 9
Supreme Court rejected an important aspect of Swain v. Alabama
and ruled that a prosecutor's purposeful exclusion of black prospective
criminal trial jurors in a given case 260 because of their presumed affinity
with a black defendant violated the accused's equal protection rights
under the fourteenth amendment.6 1 In a subsequent case the Court
split on whether Batson may be applied beyond racial characteristics to
prohibit prosecutors from exercising their peremptory challenges to exclude systematically potential capital jurors who have strong scruples
22
against the death penalty.
Using state constitutional grounds, state supreme courts led the
way in rejecting Swain, condemning the racially discriminatory exercise
of peremptory challenges, and adopting prohibitions analogous to those
to set up its capital sentencing scheme.'" Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984)).
256. See supra note 244.
257. See generally Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 203-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing state
interests offered in support of a unitary capital jury).
258. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
259. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
260. This point is the crucial aspect of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), that the Batson Court rejected. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986) (concluding that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury
solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial" (emphasis added)).
261. The Court explicitly refrained from reaching the claim that the sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to an impartial jury and one drawn from a fair cross-section of the community
were violated by the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors from service upon a criminal trial jury. See id. at 82 n.1, 84 n.4. But see Teague v.
Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (granting certiorari to address the above issue, but then declining to
resolve the issue).
262. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); see id. at 650 (plurality opinion) (dictum);
id. at 669 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 940 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); id. at 941
(Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). A federal district court recently ruled that a
state prosecutor's systematic exercise of peremptory challenges to strike jurors with misgivings
about the death penalty violated the accused's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to an impartial jury for purposes of capital sentencing. See Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381 (W.D.N.C.
1988).
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announced by the Supreme Court in Batson.26 Many did so on broader
grounds than relied upon by the Batson Court by invoking the right to
a jury that is both impartial and representative of a fair cross-section of
the community instead of invoking equal protection principles.2 64 Re-

search evidence suggests that prosecutors often exercise their peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who have scruples against
imposing the death penalty if they are not excluded for cause under
Witherspoon or Witt.2 65 This practice naturally exacerbates the impar-

tiality and fair cross-section difficulties already occasioned by those
cases. State supreme courts might well be sympathetic to such claims
because of their leadership and rationale in enforcing rights related to
the exercise of peremptory challenges.
D.

Other State ConstitutionalClaims
1. Proportionality

State constitutional provisions in at least four death penalty states
specifically require that criminal punishments be "proportioned to the

nature of the offense," or words to that effect.2 66 These provisions may
263. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). See
generally McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
264. The two leading state court cases took such an approach. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at
258, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890; Soares, 377 Mass. at 461, 387 N.E.2d at 499. This
approach may be a significantly broader one because it would presumably apply in areas besides
racial discrimination and would not require that the accused and the excluded jurors be of the
same race. Batson's equal protection analysis stipulated such limitations. See Batson, 476 U.S. at
96. See generally Acker, Exercising Peremptory Challenges After Batson, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 187,
194 n.35 (1988).
265. See Lindsay, ProsecutorialAbuse of Peremptory Challenges in Death Penalty Litigation: Some Constitutional and Ethical Considerations,88 CAMPBELL L. REv. 71 (1985); Winick,
ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1982).
266. See ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 11 (stating that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship"); IND. CONST. art. I, § 16 (declaring that "[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the
nature of the offense"); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 18. Under New Hampshire law,
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. No wise legislature will
affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those
of murder and treason. Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do the lightest offenses. For the same
reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all
punishments being to reform, not to exterminate mankind.
Id.; see also OR. CONST. art I, § 16 (stating that "all penalties shall be proportioned to offense").
But see id. art. I, § 40 (exempting capital punishment for aggravated murder from the prior provision); supra notes 118, 121-22, and accompanying text; see also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (prohibiting
"cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment" (emphasis added)). At least two noncapital punishment
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be cited effectively in presenting the argument that capital punishment
may not be imposed constitutionally for certain crimes or upon certain
offenders. This argument can be made upon cruel and unusual punishment grounds as well. Under the federal constitution, for example, proportionality principles preclude imposing death as punishment for
2 69
rape,2 7 kidnapping, 6 felony murder under limited circumstances,
and imposing it on fifteen-year-old offenders absent clearly expressed
27 0
legislative intent to the contrary.
State supreme courts may be more willing than the United States
Supreme Court has been to limit the range of offenses and the class of
offenders that may be punished with death. This tendency may be especially important with respect to felony murder,7 1 young offenders, 2
and perhaps in other areas.27 3 Unlike the Supreme Court, 7 4 they may
jurisdictions also have state constitutional provisions requiring that punishment be proportioned

to the offense. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. The limitation in these provisions
that punishment be proportioned to the nature of the "offense" incidentally raises an interesting
but speculative issue concerning the propriety of including offender characteristics such as prior
record, or inmate status among statutory aggravating factors for capital sentencing.
267. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality decision) (finding that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment for the rape of an adult).
268. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (summary disposition).
269. The Supreme Court initially prohibited the death penalty from being administered
against one convicted of felony murder who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill.
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Subsequently, the Court ruled in Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987), that a broader class of participants in a felony murder was eligible for the
death penalty, although Enmund was not overruled. See supra note 1; see also Acker, supra note
61, at 475-76.
270. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (plurality decision); id. at 2706
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 63.
271. See supra notes 1, 269, and accompanying text.
272. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court ruled that the eighth amendment does not prohibit
the states from executing offenders who were 16 or 17 years old at the time of their crimes. See 109
S. Ct. 2968 (1989). One year earlier the Court held that the federal constitution barred the states
from executing 15-year-old offenders, at least absent express legislative declaration that offenders
of this age are eligible for the death penalty. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2687; id. at 2706
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
273. E.g., State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). The New Jersey Supreme Court
struck down the death penalty as excessive and violative of the implicit proportionality requirement in the state constitution's cruel and unusual punishments clause when imposed for murder
by causing "serious bodily injury resulting in death," absent proof of the specific intent to kill. See
id. at 85, 549 A.2d at 818 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (West 1987)). The state
court explicitly noted that the state constitution afforded greater protection than the Supreme
Court had interpreted the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause to provide in
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). See Gerald, 113 N.J. at 75, 549 A.2d at 810. In an unrelated
type of disproportionality claim, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no federal constitutional
prohibition against executing mildly mentally retarded offenders. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934 (1989). A similar claim was rejected on state and federal constitutional grounds in Goodman
v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). But see Woods v. State, 531 So. 2d 79, 83-84
(Fla. 1988) (Shaw, J. and Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state constitution prohibits
execution of the mentally retarded).

1356

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1299

also require that comparative proportionality review be undertaken on
state constitutional grounds 7 5 to ensure that death sentences have not
been imposed aberrationally in individual cases. Comparative proportionality review can be conducted with varying rigor and under premises that make it more or less likely to be efficacious. 27 State courts
should be urged to oversee strictly such review under the terms of state
constitutions.
2.

Separation of Powers

Capital punishment statutes in several states have been upheld
against claims suggesting that separation of powers principles are in274. The Court ruled that California's death penalty legislation had sufficient other checks
against the threat of arbitrariness that the federal constitution did not require that the state supreme court engage in comparative proportionality review of capital sentences imposed. See Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
275. As the Supreme Court explained in Pulley:
Traditionally, "proportionality" has been used with reference to an abstract evaluation of the
appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime. Looking to the gravity of the offense and
the severity of the penalty, to sentences imposed for other crimes, and to sentencing practices
in other jurisdictions, this Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when imposed for a particular crime or category of crime ....
The proportionality review sought [in this case] ... is of a different sort. This sort of
proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime
in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless
unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on
others convicted of the same crime. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the [e]ighth
[a]mendment, applicable to the [s]tates through the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment, requires a
state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in the case
before it with the penalties imposed in similar cases if requested to do so by the prisoner.
Id. at 42-44 (footnotes omitted). See generally H. BEDAU, supra note 117, at 114-16 (calling this a
"frequency-relative" type of severity, and contrasting it to other ways in which the death penalty
may be considered excessively severe).
276. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 71-72; Baldus, Pulaski &
Woodworth, supra note 208; Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J.
97 (1979); Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of ProportionalityReview,
18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1433 (1985); Waldo, supra note 122, at 340-47. The pool of cases to which a
conviction resulting in a capital sentence is compared can make a significant difference, e.g., to all
other convictions actually resulting in capital sentences as opposed to all cases that could have
been prosecutel as capital crimes and could have resulted in capital convictions and sentences.
There are other differences that may be significant as well. While most states engage in statewide
comparative proportionality review, Louisiana courts look first to the judicial district as the region
for comparison. See State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 631-32 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1111 (1985). But see State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 325-30, 524 A.2d 188, 291-94 (1987).
277. Ironically, state constitutional challenges to appellate court proportionality review of
capital sentences have tended to concern the courts' constitutional authority to undertake such
review, rather than the procedures or implementation of the comparative review. See, e.g., State v.
Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644-46, 314 S.E.2d 493, 501-02 (1984); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 5556 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983), appeal after remand, 679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1984),
denial of sentence modification aff'd, 704 P.2d 1323 (Wyo. 1988).
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consistent with the legislation or its administration. Over dissent, the
Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the prosecutor's
decision to seek the death penalty after obtaining a capital conviction
represents an unwarranted exercise of judicial power by an executive
official.2 78 By contrast, in Indiana the district attorney's discretion to
prosecute a homicide as a capital crime has been upheld against a separation of powers challenge precisely because in that state the prosecutor
is considered a judicial official instead of a member of the executive
branch.279
In Florida, 280 Pennsylvania, 8 ' and Wyoming,28 s courts have upheld
death penalty statutes against claims that the legislative imposition of
standards to guide the exercise of sentencing discretion unconstitutionally usurped the power of the state supreme courts to promulgate rules
of trial procedure. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected
the argument that allowing the Director of the Texas Department of
Corrections to select the substance to be used to cause death by lethal
injection was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
an executive official.28 3 State constitutional challenges to the death penalty premised upon separation of powers violations have been innova84
tive although not persuasive when presented to the state courts.1
3.

Miscellaneous Grounds

A number of other issues relevant to the administration of the
death penalty can be litigated on state constitutional grounds. Some of
these simply mirror analogous federal claims, but others may be unique
to particular state constitutional provisions. Examples of the former in278. See People v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 109-10, 503 N.E.2d 255, 272 (1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1010 (1987); People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 488 N.E.2d 949, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986);
People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 185-86, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1373 (1981) (Simon, J., dissenting), appeal
after remand, 105 Ill. 2d 226, 473 N.E.2d 901 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Illinois
employs the atypical practice of allowing prosecutors to decide whether or not to seek the death
penalty after a capital conviction has been obtained rather than at an earlier stage in the process.
A federal district court, disagreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court on federal constitutional
grounds, recently ruled that the practice is unconstitutional. See United States v. Silagy, 713 F.
Supp. 1246 (C.D. Ill. 1989).
279. Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 765-66 (Ind.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 808 (1982).
280. Morgan v. State, 415 So. 2d 6, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982).
281. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 263, 516 A.2d 656, 670-71 (1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
282. Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at 50-53.
283. Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 514-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
284. A less orthodox issue was raised by Justice Linde in dissent in State v. Wagner, 305 Or.
115, 188, 752 P.2d 1136, 1181 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting). He questioned whether the initiative
that resulted in Oregon's death penalty legislation was consistent with the state's obligation to
maintain a republican form of government under the United States and Oregon Constitutions. Id.
at 1197 n.8; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; On CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
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clude arguments that statutory aggravating factors are unconstitutionally vague 285 or that indigent defendants are entitled to expert
assistance at capital trials.286 Sentencing instructions may be challenged
on the ground that they deflect the jury's attention from legally relevant considerations and infuse the capital punishment decision with an
285. A related claim is that because statutory aggravating factors are impermissibly vague
they operate, de facto, to violate ex post facto principles. Vagueness and ex post facto claims have
been raised with varying degrees of success in several state cases. See People v. Superior Court 31
Cal. 3d 797, 801, 647 P.2d 76, 77, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 801 (1982) (invalidating on federal and state
due process grounds the statutory aggravating circumstance that "[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity, as utilized in this section, the phrase
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity means a conscienceless, or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim" (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(14) (Deering 1978))); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 860-67, 268 S.E.2d 339, 344-49 (1980)
(stating that the definition of statutory aggravating circumstance as "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to
the victim," was not unconstitutionally vague, as applied, under the state and federal constitutions
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1984))), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Calhoun v.
State, 297 Md. 563, 617-23, 468 A.2d 45, 70-74 (1983) (holding that propensity for future dangerousness was not so speculative that its use as a capital sentencing factor violated article 25 of the
Declaration of Rights of Maryland's constitution), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984); State v.
Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 621 (Mo.) (rejecting the claim that aggravating circumstance that murder
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity
of mind" was unconstitutionally vague under state or federal constitution (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.2(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (emphasis added))), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 884 (1982)); State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 197-211, 524 A.2d 188, 224-32 (1987) (rejecting the claim that the aggravating circumstance that "[t]he murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," is unconstitutionally vague under state and federal constitutions (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(c)
(1982))). After Ramseur was decided, the legislature substituted "assault" for "battery" in the
statutory provision. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(c) (Supp. 1986); see also State v. Wagner,
305 Or. 115, 150-55, 752 P.2d 1136, 1158-61 (1988) (rejecting state constitutional claims that the
Oregon death penalty scheme is unconstitutionally vague or violative of ex post facto principles by
asking the jury to assess the accused's propensity for future dangerousness), vacated on other
grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989). But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that, as
applied, Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible. . ." aggravating circumstance, violated
the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it failed to guide and narrow the jury's sentencing
discretion adequately (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1984))). See generally Rosen, The
"EspeciallyHeinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The StandardlessStandard,
64 N.C.L. REv. 941 (1986); Waldo, supra note 122, at 313-26.
286. See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 193-94, 473 N.E.2d 264, 291-92 (1984) (rejecting a claim under state and federal constitutions that the indigent capital defendant receive
services of court-appointed social scientists to assist in jury selection, in evaluating pretrial publicity in conjunction with change of venue motion, and to assist in challenge to death qualified jury),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); cf. Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 64, 95-96, 271 N.E.2d 425, 442
(1971) (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (vacating the death penalty) (arguing that impoverished defendants do not get equal representation in capital cases), rev'd in part
on reh'g, 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757 (1972). But see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (recognizing a federal due process right to psychiatric assistance at guilt determination and sentencing
phase for indigent capital defendant). See generally Culver & Wold, supra note 39, at 86 (noting
some of the assistance provided capital defendants in California by virtue of California Supreme
Court rulings).
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impermissible measure of arbitrariness. 87 Right to counsel claims, specifically that a capital defendant has rights to constitutionally effective
counsel 28 8 and to counsel to pursue postappeal challenges to capital
convictions and sentences,2 8 9 also may be pursued under both state and
federal constitutions.
Some state constitutions prescribe precisely how legislation must
be introduced and enacted in state legislatures to become effective.
Challenges have been pressed in a few states on grounds that capital
punishment statutes have been adopted in violation of these provisions.
State supreme courts have rejected these claims on their facts, 9 0 although in theory they remain viable upon a proper foundation. Oregon's constitutional prohibition against waiving trial by jury in capital
cases 2 9 is another example of a state claim without a close federal con287. But see, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (rejecting the claim that capital
jury instruction concerning the governor's authority to commute a sentence of "life imprisonment
without parole" to a prison sentence with parole eligibility violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments); People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 2d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) (holding on
remand that the same instruction violated the state constitution on due process grounds); see also
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 201-03, 473 N.E.2d at 297-99 (following California v. Ramos on similar
issue raised under the state constitution).
288. The Supreme Court has required no more stringent standards for effective assistance of
counsel in capital cases than in noncapital cases under the federal constitution, and has applied
such standards in rather lax fashion. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Adequate representation for capital defendants is a particularly acute
problem. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
289. The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a federal constitutional right to court appointed counsel for the representation of state death row inmates who challenge their capital
sentences or convictions in state habeas corpus proceedings. See Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct.
2765 (1989). There is generally no federal constitutional right to counsel beyond the defendant's
direct appeal in the state courts. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See generally Mello, Facing
Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 513 (1988).
290. See, e.g., Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377, 1383-84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting the
claim that the capital punishment act violated a state constitutional provision requiring that
"'[e]very act of the [l]egislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in
its title' " (quoting OKLA. CoNsT. art. 5, § 57)), appeal after remand, 701 P.2d 1039 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986); State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Tenn.
1981) (rejecting state constitutional challenge that death penalty legislation was not read and
passed by each house of Tennessee legislature on three separate days); Marquez v. State, 725
S.W.2d 217, 234-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (rejecting the claim that the state constitution was
violated in that the caption upon proposed capital punishment legislation failed to give fair notice
of the contents of the bill).
291. The Oregon Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial
jury. . . .; provided, however, that any accused person, in other than capital cases, and with
the consent of the trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be tried by the
judge of the court alone, such election to be in writing; provided, however, that in the circuit
court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a
verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict,
and not otherwise. ...
OR. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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stitutional analogue. This provision gave rise to a heated dispute in the
Oregon Supreme Court about whether judgment could properly be entered upon a defendant's plea of guilty to a capital crime, a practice
ultimately approved by the state tribunal.29
Allegations that state death penalty statutes, or their administra-

tion, violate the provisions of particular state constitutions are too diverse and complex to consider specifically for the thirty-six states that
presently authorize capital punishment."' We can do little more than
suggest the general types of challenges that might be developed under
the unique textual provisions, historical circumstances, and policy considerations relevant to state constitutional interpretation within current
death penalty jurisdictions. The specifics of such challenges must be
left to lawyers who are willing to explore state constitutional issues exhaustively and to social science researchers who will collaborate in generating or uncovering relevant empirical data.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The renaissance of state constitutions as important sources of personal liberties and related procedural protections corresponds with the
Supreme Court's landmark federal constitutional capital punishment
decisions of the early and mid-1970s. In a series of cases the Justices
alternatively invalidated standardless capital sentencing legislation
across the land294 and upheld schemes that narrowed the range of capital crimes and provided standards to guide the exercise of sentencing
discretion.29 5 The doctrinal legacy of the High Court's approval of such
"guided discretion" legislation is strained,2 96 perhaps to the breaking
292. Wagner, 305 Or. at 115, 752 P.2d at 1136.
293. One state case, however, deserves special mention. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court invalidated capital punishment legislation on the ground that the procedures impermissibly
burdened the accused's right to trial by jury and against compelled self-incrimination under part 1,
article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150,
470 N.E.2d 116 (1984). The legislation was interpreted to allow the death penalty only after trial
by jury, and not after conviction upon a guilty plea. The result was to discourage capital defend.
ants from pleading not guilty and exercising their jury trial rights, according to the court, analogously to the procedures condemned on federal constitutional grounds in United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968). Massachusetts thus does not have valid death penalty legislation, notwithstanding a 1982 amendment to the state constitution that declared capital punishment to be not
inconsistent with that document's provisions. See MAss. CONST. pt.1, art. 26; see also supra note
118.
294. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see also supra notes 25-27
and accompanying text.
295. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality decision); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality decision); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality decision); see
also supra notes 31-35.
296. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.

1989]

DEATH PENALTY

1361

point, and fundamentally unworkable. "97 In 1987 the Court came within
a single vote of dismantling the very system it had upheld in principle
over a decade earlier as four Justices were convinced that post-Furman
statutory reforms had failed to eradicate serious problems of discrimination and arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty. 298

State supreme courts may not be as willing to tolerate the structural and procedural deficiencies in capital punishment legislation as
has a majority of the United States Supreme Court. They may be persuaded for a number of reasons that state constitutions permit or require them to diverge from the judicial gloss Supreme Court precedent
attaches to the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court is constrained
by principles of federalism, its duty of fixing minimum constitutional
standards for fifty individual states with tremendously varied histories
and cultures, and by the inhibiting effect that federal constitutional adjudication has upon the states' abilities to adapt criminal laws and procedures to their unique needs. 99 State supreme courts can be
responsive to the values and traditions reflected in state constitutional
provisions so° and to contemporary notions of fairness and decency in
their states.301 Further, their decisions are not so wide reaching and
30 2
typically not so immutable as the decisions of the Supreme Court.
303
Even if state courts choose not to deviate from federal doctrine,
much of capital punishment jurisprudence's dependence on facts and
the consequent need to examine relevant empirical issues within state
borders instead of national boundaries may cause them to resolve cases
differently than would be suggested by federal precedent. Effective
state constitutional litigation will demand that supporting information
be compiled and brought to the attention of state court judges:3 0 4 Does
the death penalty appear to deter, or inspire, homicides within a
state? 0 5 What is the likelihood that racial,30 6 geographic,3 0 7 or other le-

gally irrelevant and impermissible factors within a jurisdiction influence
capital prosecutions and sentences? What are public attitudes about
297. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
298. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also supra notes 59-62, 183-85, 204-18,
and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
303. See generally supra notes 157-81 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Bowers, The Effect of Executions
is Brutalization,Not Deterrence, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SocIAL SCIENCE

49 (K. Haas & J. Inciardi eds. 1988).
306. See supra notes 135, 208 210, and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 209, 211, and accompanying text.
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the death penalty within a state, and how are these attitudes most appropriately measured?308 What proportion of the population eligible for
jury duty will be excluded from capital jury service based upon opinions
about the death penalty, and to what extent will the death qualification
of jurors exclude minorities or women from capital juries?3 0 9 How frequently have innocent persons been placed at risk of execution within a
state?3 1 0 These and other social fact issues31 1 will require individual investigation and analysis within the several states and may lead to different conclusions than when national attitudinal and other data are
aggregated and averaged to produce a federal norm.
Lawyers who commence death penalty litigation must shift from a
jurisprudence dominated by "vertical federalism" to one of "horizontal
federalism." The former represents the traditional federal constitutional model with the United States Supreme Court at the top of the
judicial hierarchy and its decision binding the state courts in matters
within its jurisdiction. 1 2 Horizontal federalism, as the term implies, describes a process by which the several state courts seek guidance from
federal decisions and the case law of other states but are not bound to
follow the reasoning or precedent of other jurisdictions. 1 3 State constitutional analysis is within this paradigm. It assumes the essential independence of jurists, litigants, and researchers in the respective states
but also requires their intercommunication.3 14
State constitutions are remarkably diverse in their textual provisions, traditions and histories, and in the values that they reflect. Capital punishment is similarly complex in the variety of statutes used in its
implementation, its history and objectives, and the numerous details of
its administration. Related empirical issues are compound and variable
across jurisdictions. No single writing can do more than scratch the surface of the topic of state constitutions and capital punishment, and we
308. See supra notes 132, 154-60, and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 136, 246-52, and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
311. Additional social fact issues that bear on the imposition of the death penalty include the
adequacy of the capital defense bar, the representation and assistance provided indigents, and
perhaps the cost of administering the death penalty. See supra notes 53, 214, 286, 288, 289, and
accompanying text.
312. See G. TARR & C. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 5-27 (1988);
Porter & Tarr, Introduction, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM at
xi, xix-xx (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982).
313. See G. TARR & C. PORTER, supra note 312, at 27-40; Porter & Tarr, supra note 312, at

xxi-xxii.
314.

See generally Collins, supra note 8, at 408-13; id. at 413 (contending that "[h]orizontal

influence, or inter-state communication, is likely to become the reality of the 1980's); Pollock,
supra note 68, at 992 (asserting that "[h]orizontal federalism, a federalism in which states look to
each other for guidance, may be the hallmark of the rest of the century").
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do not purport to have done so here.3 15 Our examination is merely preliminary if for no other reasons than the accelerating pace at which
state constitutional doctrine and analysis is likely to advance in the immediate future and the empirical questions that await answer within
jurisdictions as the death penalty moves from abstract legislation to actual application. It is our hope that this review will at least be useful in
stimulating the legal debate and systematic research that must precede
informed state constitutional interpretation, and in encouraging judges,
lawyers, and social scientists to undertake and follow through upon
such endeavors in developing state capital punishment jurisprudence.

315. We note, however, exhortations to prepare and pursue state constitutional claims generally. See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 223-24, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (1985). The court challenged
that: "This generation of. . . lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity to aid in the formulation of
a state constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights and liberties of our people, however
the philosophy of the United States Supreme Court may ebb and flow." Id. At the same time the
opinion cautioned against resorting to the state constitution simply to evade Supreme Court precedent: "Our decisions must be principled, not result-oriented." Id.; see Abrahamson, supra note 8,
at 1144. One commentator contends that "[s]tate courts' reliance on state constitutional criminal
law is one of the most dynamic and interesting phenomena to occur in state law in years. It
presents a challenge to lawyers and judges because a new major field of law is being staked out."
Id. Arguing in support of state constitutional law, another scholar stated:
The subject of state constitutional law demands the best legal thinking because "what state
courts produce is at least partially a function of what commentators and litigants expect them
to produce." The bar, the bench, and legal scholars must give state constitutional law, both
comparative and state-specific, the attention it merits.
Williams, supra note 74, at 227-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 7 HARv. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 271, 320 (1973)).

